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ABSTRACT
There is no a consensus in the IR literature on the possible implications of AI for cyber or nuclear
capabilities, and whether AI would exacerbate, or potentially mitigate, the security dilemma between
actors with varying capabilities. This paper explores these questions, using experts’ interviews and
secondary data. It has tackled the issue under study by using the most-similar method in which most of
the variables are similar.
The paper argues the weaponization of AI exacerbates the security dilemma between states since it
increases uncertainty. What is actually problematic about the military AI applications, as opposed to
other military capabilities, is the declining role of humans. AI could be productive and
counterproductive when it comes to policy making, implying the necessity of keeping humans overthe-loop. Neutralization makes AI deterrence reasonable for avoiding destructive, disruptive and
manipulative outcomes. Like nuclear capabilities, establishing an AI-MAD structure, regulating the
uses of AI and establishing a governing regime for AI arms race are the best possible policies.
Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Deterrence, Mutually Assured Destruction, Arms Control
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Introduction:
The weaponization of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has the potential to change the
nature and the character of warfare. As seen in cyber warfare, AI is expected to be the
future battlefield of warfare since it can be used as an enabler of a weapon or it could
be weaponized as it was the case with nuclear capabilities. To put it simple, it would
allow states to employ both kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities, separately or
altogether.

The chief objective of this paper is to investigate the worrisome phenomenon of
weaponized Artificial Intelligence and how it exacerbates the security dilemma
between states in both symmetric and asymmetric settings. This in turn accelerates AI
arms race, which eventually invokes crisis instability and arms race instability. In
respect, this paper is to explore the potential implications of AI on national polices,
interstate relations, and the foundations of the international regime governing
relations between states. This piece is to suggest the formation of an international
regime for governing AI.

The weaponization of AI might put the world order and the foundations of
international peace and security at a shaky ground. Thus, state actors, non-state
actors, such as the IAEA and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, international
lawyers and private companies should consider either of the two policy options:
regulating AI and ensuring that its uses are in conformity with the parameters of the
current global regime, or establishing a novel global system, in which AI replaces
states, for maintaining international peace and security. From a utopian angle, the
establishment of a new global system looks awesome at first glance. But, the first
policy option is the most doable one given that it just requires the establishment of a
regime similar to the one which was established for regulating nuclear arms race.


Problem Statement:

There is an excessive use of Artificial Intelligence-enabled applications in the military
realm coupled with the unprecedented advancement in killer robots and the massive
production of drones. This mirrors the hasty inclination to possess the most advanced
AI military applications, so as to intensify AI race. The IR literature has narrowed
down the focus to the possible implications of AI on nuclear capabilities without
investigating how AI will alter the nature of a weapon technology. The IR literature
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has failed to see the other side of coin and did not investigate how AI could be
employed for confidence-building and for enhancing security. It is illogical to assume
the uselessness of AI; a developed version of cyber technology, in cyber defense.

Besides to investigating the potentials of AI from a technical point of view, there is a
need to explore the implications of AI on interstate relations and how the AI race
could be addressed. Also, ushering for international legal instruments and the call for
coherent policies at the national and international levels are essential for regulating
the uses of AI. The international community should accept the fact that AI race is
irreversible, but regulating it is the best possible choice.

The IR literature has largely overlooked the possible implications of coupling other
weapons, including nuclear and cyber, with AI capabilities and has lamentably
disregarded to investigate how that might increase their destructive potentials, and
uncertainty. This paper explores whether the weaponization of AI could create a
MAD-like structure since it exacerbates the security dilemma between states? The
paramount objective of this paper is to investigate the efficacy of AI, which
aggravates the security dilemma between states, as a deterrent tool. In the context of
offense-defense theory, it investigates how AI, either as an enabler of a weapon or a
weapon, would dictate future wars, and it also examines would it makes offense or
defense dominant. Along with exploring the implications of AI on other weapon
systems, this paper raises a question: would signaling an AI second-strike capability
or establishing an AI equivalent of Mutually Assured Destruction reduce the
probability of a cyber, conventional or even a nuclear war? To answer this, this
piece introduces two hypotheses: (i) Nuclear MAD could create an AI-MAD even if
the first-strike capability is advantageous in the cyber realm; (ii) AI capabilities
could strengthen cyber defense, thereby AI-MAD could be feasible.


Argument:

Since the civilian AI applications have been weaponized with their potentials
to revolutionize and change the nature and the character of future wars, there
is no doubt that AI with its dual-use nature does exacerbate the security
dilemma between states in both symmetric and asymmetric settings. AI
strengthens cyber deterrence by preemption and by demonstrating the ability
to retaliate in the cyber realm. AI, like nuclear capabilities, has its advantages
6

and disadvantages since it can enhance cyber defense and nuclear safety, on
the one hand, and can be employed wrongfully and in a manipulative way, on
the other. This further indicates that AI has the second-strike capability amid
the growing uncertainty over its potentials, and the intentions of rivalry states.
AI deterrence can exist in tandem with nuclear deterrence due to its
destructive, disruptive and manipulative potentials. Based on that, an AI MAD
like structure is the optimal policy option for mitigating the security dilemma
between states and maintaining international peace and security. This
requires finding out ways for diluting the pace of AI arms race, which has
been deviated from the commercial sphere to the military one. Accordingly,
the international community should make all efforts to regulate the uses of AI
and control AI proliferation since we cannot reverse it. This indicates that
regulating the uses of AI through the establishment of legal instruments will
not be sufficient, notably with the involvement of private companies.
Regulating AI requires both a political will and a consensus, otherwise the
outcomes would be disastrous. A comprehensive framework, incorporating
the legal, political, ethical, economic and security aspects, is highly
recommended for maintaining international peace and security. More
important, the international community should not allow, under any
circumstances, militaries to be governed by machines since the psychological
factor is crucial in military‟s decision-making.

Client Description:
Dr Waleed Rashad:
Brief Bio:
Dr. Walled Rashad is an assistant professor of sociology at the National Center for
Social and Criminological Research. In parallel with his career of over 15 years, he
has contributed to academic research in the area of cyber security. He publishes his
studies and findings at many periodical journals, including the Democracy Journal
(Al-Democrateya) and The Contemporary Thinking Journal (Al-Fakr Al-Mo’aser).
Some of his contributions were published by Egypt Police Research Center. His
academic contributions have included: two studies on “Cyber/Internet Cafés: under
the titles of “Internet Cafes as a Public Sphere” and “Virtual Actors’ Interactions”;
two book chapters under the titles of “Social Mobilization in the Cyber Domain” and
“Social Strata and the Transformations of the Virtual Community: National
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and

International Debate”; a study on the interactions that take place in the cyber domain.
He also co-authored a study under the title of “The Internet as An Alternative Media
Platform”. He also wrote a book review entitled as “Cyber Culture” and a journal
article entitled as “The Internet of Things (IoTs): A Sociological Approach”.
Moreover, he participated in many symposiums and conferences. He also has earned a
Ph.D. of Arts from Ain Shams University and three master’s degrees of sociology.
One of his master thesis tackled the multiple actors in the cyber sphere.

His recognizable experience in the field of research will certainly provide a thorough
insight into the analogy between AI and cyber capabilities, in addition to nuclear
ones. Based on his academic experience in the field, he will provide a thorough
analysis and a convincible evaluation of the research findings. He could also validate
or nullify the findings of this research when it comes to practicality. Also, he could
assess the applicability of the policy recommendations suggested in this research or
even add more recommendations. Adding to this, he might direct the academic
community to the negative implications of AI weaponization coupled with the
weaponization of the Internet of Things (IoTs) or even usher for, at the sidelines of
symposiums and conferences, any of the policy recommendations mentioned in this
paper.

Background:
The use of Artificial Intelligence in militaries is not a new phenomenon, but the
inclination to upgrade AI military applications and semi-autonomous drones to
those that can operate autonomously and without humans‟ intervention is the
eye-catching phenomenon that raises concerns among scholars and experts.
For the time being, AI is bolted into arrays of weapon systems, such as aircrafts,
submarines, and is also installed in command and control systems (C2), and critical
logistical infrastructure, (Meserole, 2018). Today’s AI is somehow limited in its
capacities but with the possible progress in the dreamy one-shot learning and quantum
computing, the security dilemma will become irreducible.

Over the past years, militaries have proliferated and have produced armed drones that
can serve at both the tactical and operational levels, in an effort to reduce human
causalities and gain a military advantage. Donald Rumasfeld; the former Secretary of
Defense, had introduced the concept of “the mechanization of war” by which the US
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army is made up of half robots and half humans, (Soliaman, 2019). The US
Department of Defense has made AI, besides to human soldiers and manned
personnel, as an integral element of its Third Offset Strategy. In an effort to slash
costs, it was reported that Japan’s AI-enabled rockets is underway, (Nausca, 2011).
Due to the effectiveness of semi-autonomous weapons systems, both “killer robots”
and unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) have become very appealing to many actors.

AI was supposed to be used for surveillance, reconnaissance and military tactical
operations, but its uses have broadened when states employed AI applications in their
information and cyber warfare. In 2010, Israel and US launched Stuxnet against Iran’s
nuclear facilities in lieu of a conventional military attack, marking a paradigm shift in
warfare. Since then, the cyber domain, coupled with the growing reliance on UAVs
and drones, has become the new battleground. The most recent example is the
Russian information warfare by which it took measures to overtly or covertly
influence, (Polyakova, 2018) the American public opinion during the latest US
presidential elections. There are many other examples of an AI-enabled cyber
warfare, of which the deviation of a civilian flight from its destination, (Rashad,
2019). All of these examples signify the protraction in the uses of AI applications and
cyber capabilities. Such an observation is critically important since a number of
experts expressed their concerns over the possibility of misusing AI capabilities for
subverting those of an adversary, (Giest et al, 2018).
As a result, the term of “Algorithmic Warfare” has dominated the IR literature
since it will change the battlefield we know with the primacy of intelligence warfare
and will dictate future wars. 30 scientists, technologists and military experts pointed
out that there will be three new elements that will define and will shape the future
battlefield by 2050. These are cyber capabilities and technologies; a complex, highly
disputed information sphere, as well as a human force with advanced physical and
cognitive skills, (Kott et al, 2015). These elements have stimulated an AI arms race,
with China attempting to surpass the US and to become a key player in the AI plane,
(China May Match, 2017). More than 30 countries possess or are developing drones
for military uses, such as intercepting high-speed rockets, (Scharre, 2017).

Ongoing speculations about the weaponization of AI have generated contradictory
opinions over the potentials of AI on nuclear, cyber and even conventional weapons.
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Each camp holds differing views over the promising and negative potentials of AI
over nuclear and cyber capabilities. For nuclear capabilities, Theorists argued that
exploiting new technologies makes nuclear stalemate reversible and reduces nuclear
survivability which is actually based on concealment, hardening and redundancy,
(Lieber et al, 2017). Meanwhile, it can bolster nuclear counterforce. Concerning cyber
capabilities, the automation of data analysis and targets prioritization trigger data
poisoning, (Brundage et al, 2018). However, AI-enabled detecting software will
embolden cyber defense with their abilities to detect code vulnerabilities.

Scholars have also observed that a mass of AI-enabled applications could threaten
both combatants and non-combatants, and it would make “algorithmic warfare”,
(Layton, 2018) in contravention to international law. The inherent hazards of
unregulated “algorithmic warfare”, coupled with the absence of humans, could entail
unintended engagement, causing fratricide and civilian causalities or triggering
inadvertent escalation, (Layton, 2018). From a security perspective, fully autonomous
weapons and unmanned vehicles seem impractical for matters of life and death, unless
humans are over-of-the loop, since they cannot operate in or effectively adapt to
highly changeable and complex environments, (Layton, 2018). Also, in the context of
cyber warfare, unregulated algorithms, coupled with the weaponization of the Internet
of Things (IoTs), could induce cost on adversaries by attacking critical infrastructure
and networks, (Liff, 2012) thereby triggering causalities among non-combatants and
civilians. The literature has suggested various policy options for regulating and
mitigating the uses of AI, and for avoiding future intelligence and algorithmic
warfare. Some of these policy options are useful, such as the synergy between human
cognition and machines intelligent computation. Arguably, the human-machine
teaming would complement the missing piece of the puzzle through advanced, speedy
data analysis and human cognition. Adding to this suggestion, there are calls for
drafting a Digital Geneva Convention, (Why We Urgently Need, 2017) and
preventive arms control. Further, the weaponization of AI has raised concerns among
states’ leaders, CEOs of private companies, and over 60 NGOs, (Scharre, 2017)
which called for the banning of AI, (Autonomous Weapons: An Open Letter, 2015).

In parallel, several steps and endeavors were taken, including the announcement of an
International Panel on Artificial Intelligence by Canada and France at the sideline of
a G7 conference. The aims have been providing support, embracing the responsible
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adoption of a human-oriented AI and facilitating international cooperation, (Shead,
2018). Also, the Berkman Klein Center launched the “Ethics and Governance of
Artificial Intelligence Initiative” for bolstering the proper use of AI, (Ethics and
Governance of AI). All of these mesmerizing endeavors imply how pressuring the AI
weaponization and denote the urgency of taking a global collective action.

Therefore, experts and policy-makers should be far-sighted while assessing AI as a
weapon/an enabler by investigating how it would spark arms race, and should
hypothesize its implications when it is either nascent or advanced and when humans
are over- and out-of-the loop. They should also consider the malignant and the
harmless uses of AI while investigating its implications on the security dilemma,
which usually exacerbates because of the AI’s effectiveness, scalability, rapid
diffusion, speedy potentials, and its dual-use nature, (Brundage, 2018). They should
also consider how to ameliorate and reduce uncertainty which arises because of the
manipulative and disruptive potentials of AI and because of the emergence of new
threats and vulnerabilities, such as impersonation, (Brundage, 2018) redirection of
flights, amid the absence of punitive and attributive measures.

Literature Review:
Technological advances are a double-edged sword for a state’s national security. On
the one hand, new technology can enhance a state’s defensive capacity, and can
enhance a state’s ability to deter potential hostile acts by adversaries. On the other
hand, technological advances can also exacerbate the security dilemma. Likewise,
technological advances spur potentially destabilizing arms races between rival powers
when they are neither certain over the sort of capabilities developed nor their
implications on the balance of power. When a rival state increases its defensive
capability, the security dilemma exacerbates in this respect. With weapons of mass
destruction (WMDs), states may launch pre-emptive or even preventive strikes, when
they suspect an adversary of developing new and potentially dangerous capabilities as
it was the case when Israel attacked Iraq in 1981. Paradoxically, such strikes or
rhetoric threatening such acts are often seen as justifications for acquiring more
advanced and destructive weapons.
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Technological advances lead to the escalation of the security dilemma and the
emergence of new military revolutions. Based on the history of military development,
ten military revolutions took place as a result of technological advances,
(Krepinevich, 1994). The weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons are
perfect examples of technological advances that exacerbated the security dilemma
between rival states during the Cold War era. Based on Krepinevich’s argument,
further military revolutions will occur inasmuch as technological advances are steady,
thereby exacerbating the security dilemma since an adversary maintains a competitive
advantage, (Krepinevich, 1994). Like other technologies, Artificial Intelligence (AI),
the latest innovative technology which is currently used in daily life routines, might
heighten the security dilemma and might underwrite a new military revolution amid
the increasing tendency to use it in the military sphere. Based on Krepinevich’s
argument, the application of Artificial Intelligence to military sphere would result in a
military revolution that requires organizational innovation, the production of a new
system, organizational adaptation and technological change within military
organizations, (Krepinevich, 1994).

Though Artificial Intelligence (AI) is not a newly invented technology, it has lately
gained momentum due to recent cataclysms over its potential implications over both
national and international security amid the increasing tendency to weaponize it and
to use it in military applications. AI has dozens of definitions which mirror the
developments and advances in such a kind of technology throughout the past decades.
The definition of AI has broadened from being merely termed as the automation and
the computation of intelligent behavior to be defined as the ability of computerized
systems to implement tasks which are used to be performed by humans only and to
replicate mental skills, including the perception of natural languages, pattern
recognition and adaptive learning, which have been monopolized by humans, (De
Spiegeleire et al, 2017). As a result of steady progress in AI, the AI literature has laid
out four approaches of artificial intelligence: (1) computerized systems that think
humanly, (2) computerized models which are designed to think rationally, (3)
machines that act like human beings, and (4) the creations of automated systems that
act and behave rationally, (De Spiegeleire et al, 2017). These four approaches can be
categorized under two dimensions: (1) thought process and (2) rationality, (Russell,
2009). This classification highlights various orientations and paradigms of AI.
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Such a progress in AI sheds the light on the plausible implications of AI upon the role
of human in the military sphere in the aftermath of using machine learning and deep
reinforcement learning. This implies that AI could pose a threat to a state’s security
since there are aspirations for making human-out of the loop, thus machines will
surpass human intelligence after they have been used either for carrying out certain
tasks in alignment with human intelligence or performing a full range of tasks with a
human supervision, (De Spiegeleire et al, 2017). AI meanwhile enhances the
capabilities of a state. Therefore, uncertainty over the military, legal, and
humanitarian impacts of AI weapons looms over the horizon.

Artificial Intelligence resembles nuclear weapons in terms of being initially invented
for peaceful and civilian purposes, and for being eventually used for military
purposes. Artificial intelligence has a great potential for being used in diverse sectors
ranging from medicine, education, business, finance, cybersecurity to marketing, (De
Spiegeleire et al, 2017).

However, both AI researchers and IR specialists are

concerned with the potential weaponization of AI, and they highlight the need to
avoid errors and regulate AI for peaceful purposes. There have been military
applications of Artificial Intelligence such as drones, including robots and anti-missile
systems, (Bates, 2017). The commonality between nuclear weapons and artificial
intelligence also includes the probability of spurring AI arms race to mitigate the
security dilemma and restore strategic stability, (Geist et al, 2018). Equivalent to the
nuclear weapons, it is hard to define the nature of AI as weapon and how it would
affect states’ behavior, as per Mohan who highlighted the problematic nature of good
and bad weapons/technologies. He stressed that the differentiation between good and
bad weapons/technologies is challenging given that certain weapons/technologies
could be a stabilizing factor at some point due to targeting accuracy and their efficacy
in a second-strike capability.

However, they could eventually be regarded as

destabilizing weapons, if other sorts of anti-weapons technologies such as AntiBallistic Missiles are developed, (Mohen, 1986).

With this analogy between AI and nuclear weapons and their destructive potentials,
and with the rapid advances in AI, it is worth considering how they might exacerbate
the security dilemma since there is a consensus in the IR literature over the
undeniable inclination to militarize the AI technology. However, the AI literature in
itself is polarized over the use of AI in the military realm. Proponents claimed that AI
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militarization has its own advantages. Such advantages range from decreasing the
number of human combatants which would definitely reduce causalities to the
accessibility to dangerous areas through the employment of unmanned vehicles and
robots, (Etzioni et al, 2017). They additionally argued that AI would be of great help
in the decision-making process since robots are equipped to carry out and coordinate
multitasks, (Etzioni et al, 2017). Consequently, around of 30 states, (Autonomous
Weapons, 2016) are pursuing AI capabilities including the United States which
develops killer robots for integrating them in its third offset strategy.

Proponents also supported automation in weapons since they mistakenly assume that
autonomous weapons could put an end to the legal dilemma over civilian causalities,
(Autonomous Weapons, 2016) thereby precluding a state’s responsibility. On the
contrary, as opponents always emphasize on both ethical and legal dilemmas of using
autonomous weapons and the negative repercussions of the declining humans control
over the course of war, autonomous weapons would increase civilian causalities. With
the development of AI-enabled weapons, humans might not be the essential operators,
(Autonomous Weapons, 2016). Hence, this nullifies the view point of proponents,
arguing that autonomous weapons could have better abilities in targeting and
discriminating military objects from civilian ones, as well as performing tasks with
greater precision and reliability. Proponents’ assumption is dubious given that humans
have better judging abilities and can act as either moral agents or human as fail-safe
when autonomous weapons fail to judge the situation correctly, to adapt to changing
circumstances or to perform tasks effectively, (Autonomous Weapons, 2016). More
importantly, the utilization of AI in armed conflicts sets off alarm bells over the
applicability of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), (Kreps et al, 2012). Defenders
of autonomous weapons see that AI would fulfil the requirements of Article 48 of the
1977 additional Protocol, (Kreps, 2012). However, such an assumption is
unreasonable because AI could instigate collateral damage due to fallacious
distinction. Thus, the ongoing controversy over AI highlights the dichotomy between
autonomy in weapons and human control.

This transformation in the usage of AI technology accentuates that the security
dilemma will be intensifying. Today’s conflicts accelerate vicious races in technology
for the purpose of enhancing a state’s defensive power to avoid annihilation, as John
Hers argued. Though this argument is short-sighted given its disregarded the fact that
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the security dilemma is mutual. Robert Jervis speculates that the security dilemma
arises when a state accumulates more capabilities, such as AI, in an effort to
strengthen its security, thereby endangering the security of the other state, (Tang,
2009).

Tang argued that a genuine security dilemma exists when anarchy prevails, and
defensive measures are taken without malicious intentions. (Tang, 2009). This
classification helps rivals differentiate between accidental escalation under the
security dilemma and a measured response to possible aggression. Thus, Jervis and
Tang’s definitions incorporate of both objective sense which assesses the lack of
threats to a state’s acquired values, and subjective sense which represents the freedom
from fear over the loss of a state’s values, (Buzan, 1991). In other words, their
definitions are based on Arnold Wolfers’ definition of security that entails both the
material aspect and the psychological factor. They likewise coincide with Kenneth
Waltz’s definition of security that sees world as anarchic due to the lack of upperhand authority, resulting in the emergence of self-help system where competition
exists, (Williams et al, 2008).

Thus, in the current anarchic system, (Waltz 1959), AI could tighten the security
dilemma due to the uncertainty over its destructive capabilities and adversaries’
intentions even if they are merely security-seekers. Thus, Tang’s contribution to the
literature would help states in measuring the severity of the security dilemma when it
applies to the AI realm. To assess the severity of the security dilemma in the AI
realm, there is a need to decide whether offense or defense is dominant. Given that the
AI literature is still undeveloped, there is no a clear-cut assumption about the nature
of AI as a weapon. The AI literature has mistreated the offense-defense balance and it
has not thoroughly tackled the relation between AI and other types of weapons.

The AI literature has unduly covered the mismatch between AI and conventional
weapons in spite of striking advancement in killer robots and unmanned weapons that
are expected to replace manned soldiers in the foreseeable future. Accordingly, what
stands out is the profound investigation of the relation between AI, on one hand and
nuclear, cyber and conventional weapons, on the other hand. This further illustrates
that these weapons should not be investigated separately when their implications upon
AI deterrence are investigated. The rationale behind this is to hypothesize probable
15

scenarios of the security dilemma based on types of weapons developed and
possessed in tandem with AI capabilities.

As the security dilemma exists when a state develops weapons or technologies that
enhance its ability to attack and when a defender finds itself in status where the
strategic balance has shifted, the theory of the offense-defense balance should be
considered to determine the severity of the security dilemma. Jervis argued that
defense is dominant when a defender has no willingness to launch preemptive strikes
or to carry out preventive attacks to avoid depletion of resources and enormous costs
of war, (Jervis, 2009). In other words, a state’s perception about the severity of the
security dilemma is partially based on its relative ease and the shift in the balance of
power, (Lieber et al, 2017). Furthermore, Jervis claimed that restoring the balance of
power is feasible by catching up capabilities, so as to increase the chances of
cooperation, (Jervis, 2009). While, offense becomes dominant when both sides have
equal defense budgets; the benefits of preemptive attacks are much higher than
inaction; the first-strike is advantageous, and when the loser lacks concrete evidences
about the winner/adversary’s intentions, (Jervis, 2009). By applying this to AI, it is
worthy to consider the effect of such a novel technology on the mobility of weapons
(killer robots, cyber weapons) and their destructive power, (Lieber et al, 2017) to
decide whether AI weapons favor offense or defense.

Beside to evaluating the

strategic, operational and the tactical aspects of an AI strike, empirical logic says that
both the psychological aspect, and the reconcilability and irreconcilability of interests
should be studied, (Tang, 2009). Given that AI specialists and researchers have
disregarded the possibility of using civilian AI capabilities in the military sphere, in
spite of plentiful incidents in the history of warfare and the noticeable reliance on
drones and unmanned vehicles, it is highly significant to take conflict of interests, the
offense-defense variables, and technological advances into consideration when
measuring the severity of the security dilemma.

Based on the severity of the security dilemma that could be exacerbated by the
development of AI capabilities, states’ behavior, as Jevris noted, will be influenced
either by reciprocal fears of retaliation, reciprocal malign intention as rivals develop
capabilities to intentionally deter each other, (Tang, 2009) and the enormous
implications of exhausting military resources if the security dilemma is genuine,
(Jervis, 2009).
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The novelty of such a kind of technology mounted an intense debate over the
development of AI capabilities since peaceful applications could trigger AI machineled wars. Some experts concluded that artificial intelligence could put personal
privacy at stake through surveillance monitoring; it also could be used as a coercive
weapon since it can explore points of weakness in a business organization, (The New
Dogs of War, 2017). Since it could threaten a business organization, a state’s security
could be threatened as well. More importantly, tracking AI weaponry suppliers would
be problematic since AI factories are just integrated networks of virtual facilities.
Further, it would be challenging to identify the types of AI capabilities whether for
peaceful or military and subversive purposes, (The New Dogs of War, 2017). Though
the security experts who participated in Threatcasting Workshop accurately identified
threats of AI, they disregarded other possible threats of weaponized artificial
intelligence. A different group of scholars, on the other hand, see that AI could
heighten the security dilemma through the utilization of malicious cyber capabilities
and disinformation, as well as surveillance for data mining, (Osoba et al, 2017). This
raises a question about the difficulty of attribution

There are other factors that could exacerbate the security dilemma in a dyadic
relationship even when AI capabilities are developed for peaceful, commercial and
civilian purposes, including the Research and Development (R&D) expenditure,
progress in education, economic prosperity, as well as surveillance and
reconnaissance. The AI medical applications, for instance, could be weaponized
through the exploitation of or the hacking of medical data attached to the internet by
attackers/states to inflict damage upon defenders. The production of AI intelligent
machines for the sake of profit could trigger arms race at the regional level, (Layton,
2018).

Adding to this, cyber capabilities which are linked to AI software could be
destructively exploited to launch offense strikes and to disrupt a state’s infrastructure,
(Eckersley et al, 2018). Cyber capabilities coupled with AI ones could worsen the
security dilemma since it enhances both offensive and defensive powers of a state visa-vis its neighboring country. This reflects uncertainty over adversaries’ intentions
and vulnerability of a states’ security system since AI software could stalk on
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opponent’s security system to attack its weakest point and make it inoperative, (Allen
et al, 2017).

Concerning information security, cyber-enabled software, along with social media
botnets would aggravate the security dilemma and would menace a state’s economy
and its regime through the spread of fake news and data poisoning, (Allen et al,
2017). Peaceful applications of AI could be used as a sabotage to inflict grave
economic loss, (Allen et al, 2017).

In the conventional domain, the diffusion of killer robots into real militaries poses a
threat to a state’s security since its territory is prone to attacks by robots, (Eckersley et
al, 2018). So, peaceful AI applications have their own pros and cons since they make
individuals’ life easier but endangering their privacy in the light of individualized and
intelligentized warfare.

Adding to this, the heated debate over the legality of AI-enabled weapons with the
difficulty of attribution also reflects international lawyers overwhelming perplexity.
Around of five arguments have emerged in the international law literature. Of which,
bestowing a legal personality for AI entities which in turn raises a question about
liability and accountability in case of non-compliance to international legal
instruments or the commissioning of illegal acts, (Burri, 2017). This further raises the
alarm bells over the inability of international lawyers to define liability in the AI
realm and to outline the cases where a state would be legally responsible for using AI
applications in the military sphere. While, another argument articulates, the banning
of fully autonomous weapons under a new set of international legal instruments. It
further suggests that low level/semi-autonomous weapons could be lawful and could
be regulated under the international law, thereby lessening the security dilemma.
Thus, a precise legal definition of a meaningful human control, where the symbiosis
between humans and machines is defined, should be drafted for avoiding future
conflicts between AI possessing countries and AI not possessing countries, (Burri,
2017). Since retaining a degree of control over machines and autonomous weapons
seems challenging in the age of algorisms-based warfare, a new set of international
legal instruments could regulate the utilization of AI weapons in conformity with the
Law of Armed Conflict and the International Criminal Law, (Burri, 2017). The
problem of attribution, notably when humans are out of the loop, provides an
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illustration of how states are subject to the will of machines and are also might be
legally responsible according to public international law, (Burri, 2017). This further
implies that public international law should lay out the decisions that should not be
delegated, under any circumstances, to autonomous machines, (Burri, 2017), in
addition to outlining the situations where humans should be in/over the loop to master
the course of war. Another group of international lawyers have introduced a
supposition suggesting the emergence a super-soft law through the creation of
international ethical and moral standards, (Burri, 2017). As per this argument, such a
bottom-up law-making process could be binding at the state level. Janet Koven’s
counterargument, refuting ethical and moral standardization and their inapplicability
to the international landscape, (Burri, 2017) was factual and logical amid ongoing AI
arms race. Further, such a bottom-up lawmaking raises a question about the political
will and the essentiality of incorporating states in the lawmaking process.

Since AI has triggered an arms race in the commercial sphere which in turn has been
shifted to the military one (Research and Development in automotive, information
and communication; aerospace and defense constituted were immense throughout
2014-2016), (Cuminings, 2017), the AI literature anticipated an array of AI future
scenarios. One of those scenarios is a “Sputnik Event” triggering a sharp AI race
between states since maintaining an AI superiority could enhance economic, military,
defensive, scientific and geopolitical powers of a state, (De Spiegeleire et al, 2017).
This implies that a Sputnik-like incident for AI is not improbable amid the ongoing
space warfare. Thus, AI race could pose a threat to a state’s security, notably the
weaker one. But it could be a stabilizing factor in case of parity.

This raises a plethora of questions about the validity of using AI as a deterrent tool
and the probable implications of developing AI upon the relations between rivals. One
possibility, as previously discussed in this paper, is the exacerbation of the security
dilemma, which could potentially lead to pre-emptive strikes. Another possibility is
the operation of deterrence -– much like MAD with nuclear weapons - when a state is
being informed of a rival’s capacity to launch its own destructive strike.

Based on the above, AI could exacerbate the security dilemma, thus the strategy of
deterrence which has gained momentum among IR scholars during the Cold War era,
reintroduces itself as a possible solution for the underlying dilemma. However, it
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could be problematic when it is applied to AI. Firstly, the elements of deterrence
should be investigated to assess the soundness of AI as a deterrent tool. The elements
of the classical deterrence theory, coined by Hobbes, include self-interests, material
gains, unavoidable conflict and rationality to the international realm. As per the
findings of other scholars, namely Cesare Beccaria, the strategy of deterrence pertains
the threat of inflicting high costs on perpetrators to dissuade them from committing
crimes, (Dilulio).
In other words, the rational theory of deterrence revolves around a state’s ability to
dissuade its adversary from carrying out certain actions through latent force.
According to classical theory, deterrence operates when an adversary assumes that its
rival has considerable military capabilities, threats are credible, and costs would be
undesirable should provocative actions be taken, (Quackenbush, 2011). Therefore,
credible ultimatums and the threat of use force are fundamental for effective
deterrence. Secondly, the level of technological advancement and the dominant trend
of weaponization should be studied to determine the severity of the security dilemma,
and to question if AI would deter a state from attack, thus the security dilemma will
no longer operate since none of the rival states would be defensive, (Jervis, 2009).

By tracing rapid advancement in technologies and weapons and how it has altered the
art of war throughout the past decades, the term “killer robots” was invented in
response to the excessive use of drones and robots in military. This term underlines
the salient apprehension over the ability of “killer robots”, as per Sharkey’s argument,
to act like humans since they lack human capabilities and human intelligence that are
required for making military decisions, (Sharkey, 2012). This illustrates that killer
robots have their own limitations when it comes to war. Since AI weapons would not
be able to differentiate between civilian and military targets and can cause collateral
damage, autonomous weapon targeting is worrisome, (Etizioni et al, 2017).

The Israeli Harpy is a perfect example of this problem since it cannot distinguish
whether the radar is located on an anti-aircraft station or on a civilian facility,
(Sharkey, 2012). This raises a question about the ability of lethal artificial weapons
and killer robots to cope the pace of strategic decision-making in combat, especially
in densely populated areas. Moreover, Garcia’s argument about the inevitability of
disruptive change in the domains of international peace and security is convincing
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given that the weaponization of AI signifies the erosion of fundamental international
norms that regulate the use of force, (Garcia, 2018).

If superiority in AI, as Garcia pointed out, would come in favor of the superior,
(Garcia, 2018), should it wipe out a state’s ability to respond. If the superior state has
the ability to launch a first-strike, deterrence will not work and offense will dominate.
As nuclear weapons have changed the calculus of war during the Cold War, AI, as
Randolph claimed, could tighten cyberspace and outer space warfare in the wake of
unprecedented reliance on easily disrupted cyber capabilities, (Kent, 2015). In spite of
this, scholars are looking forward to tailoring a new doctrine for regulating warfare in
cyberspace, some of them argued that the first-strike is advantageous in cyberwarfare
because it is cheaper, and attribution will be challenging since it is hard to track
perpetrators. Thus, the IR literature should devote more focus on the influence of AI
capabilities coupled with either cyber capabilities, nuclear capabilities or even both
capabilities on the second-strike capability. The literature has tackled the first-strike
capability in the cyber sphere, but with the weaponization of AI, there is a pressing
need to reassess this argument given that “killer robots” could make the second-strike
capability a preferable option since the extent of destruction is still obscure and the
immunity of noncombatants, (Crosston, 2011) a fundamental criterion of Jus ad bello,
is still unsettled.

By the same token, there is a strong debate over the possibility of a nuclear war in the
light of robust advantages in both cyber and AI capabilities. Subversionist scholars
purported that AI could trigger nuclear warfare since adversaries could mislead or
alter AI capabilities, (Geist et al, 2018). Subervisionists’ view point concurs with the
alarmists who conceive that advanced Artificial Intelligent capabilities would render
nuclear arsenals vulnerable, thereby diminishing the strategic balance, (Geist et al,
2018). Accordingly, AI could be destabilizing given that it could make the secondstrike capability ineffective, (Geist et al, 2018). However, the literature has dismissed
the fact that nuclear weapons have been used for deterrence even with the occurrence
of disinformation and cyberattacks. This could tell that nuclear weapons could deter
an AI first-strike capability since city-sparing, cyberspace-sparing and machinesparing dictate leaders’ decisions.
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Since AI could sharpen the security dilemma through uncertain technological
asymmetries between great powers and small states, a question raises itself about the
efficacy of small arsenals as a means of deterrent. In the nuclear realm, small arsenals
have been successful deterrent as the literature demonstrated it is a matter of
possession such a kind of destructive weapons. As Jervis stated small arsenals and
moderate military expenditure could neutralize disparity and high military
expenditure, so as to restore the second-strike capability. This has been the situation
with the nuclear weapons. Weak and small states, as Jervis argued, usually prefer
defense and seek cooperation, but because they might resort to preemptive or
preventive strikes due to their undesirable position, (Jervis, 2009). This, consequently,
reduces chances of cooperation. If it is true that the first-strike is advantageous in the
cyber realm, small and weak states could launch cyberattacks as preemptive strikes.
This could generate two scenarios: (1) a retaliatory attack by using AI capabilities,
causing collateral damage and making defense dominant or (2) inaction since the
defender has no other options to retaliate, therefore making offense dominant. If the
defender does not possess a nuclear arsenal, the weaker state could launch AI-enabled
cyberattacks. Therefore, it is highly possible to carry out a nuclear or an AI strike.
However, the situation would be quite different when a state possesses cyber, nuclear
and AI capabilities given that both nuclear capabilities and AI applications, which
enhance cyber defense, could make defense dominant. More importantly, geography
and the location of weapons could be determinant factors in the strategy of deterrence.
As Jervis allured both conventional weapons and nuclear weapons are defenseoriented based on geostrategic position and the location of nuclear weapons. The
same can be applied to the AI realm, though it instantly favors offense, due to tactical
and operational considerations; the vulnerability of both nuclear and AI weapons, in
addition to high exposure of critical infrastructure through cyberattacks. In
conclusion, deterrence could be effective in today’s world.

In addition to technology, geography and various capabilities, the power to hurt is an
integral element of deterrence as Thomas Schelling elaborated that the power to hurt
is a sort of diplomacy that makes threats credible since it is measured by the degree of
suffering and pain that could be inflicted upon a rival, (Schelling, 2008). It basically
rests on the use of latent violence and the infliction or the withholding of pain,
(Schelling, 2008). This further indicates that deterrence requires the defender to
communicate with the defector about possible course of actions in case of
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noncompliance while not necessitating to haphazardly leave the course of war to
chance, otherwise, destructive war will erupt. Comparable to latent nuclear deterrence
which is grounded on a state’s intention to reduce the time required for producing a
nuclear bomb, and nuclear latency which is based on the capabilities, (Fuhrmann,
2018) AI could be latent since AI proliferation is expected not to end and rivals would
seek more capabilities, as well as the fact that cyber capabilities could inflict pain
upon the defender and could also be a credible threat. In addition to that, R&D
expenditure and the production of enormous commercial and medical applications
could be signs of latent violence since rival states can convey ultimatums through
steady progress in AI technologies.
This argument nullifies the IR literature’s suggestion of “deterrence by denial” which
deters the adversary from acquiring further capabilities. It is almost impossible to
deter a state from possessing AI or cyber capabilities amid the ongoing arms race and
the increasing asymmetry. Past incidents in nuclear deterrence accentuate the efficacy
of deterrence by punishment as opposed to deterrence by denial, as it was the case in
the Israeli strike against Iraq’s nuclear arsenal. While deterrence by denial is the
favored option of small states, it failed to dissuade great powers from developing
more weapons. That is why, Paul Davis introduced dissuasion by denial as a
replacement of deterrence by denial. He claimed that dissuasion by denial pertains the
calculation of potential repercussions of carrying out an attack based on expected
value and worst/best-case scenario, (Davis, 2014). To this end, the defector should be
informed of the positive outcomes of de-escalation and vice versa. Therefore, AI
deterrence could be a mosaic of latent violence and dissuasion by denial. This retells
the Cuban Missile Crisis when deterrence by punishment along with concessions and
assurances prevented the outbreak of a destructive war. However, latent violence and
punishment will be the core of AI deterrence.

The cognitive theory/prospect theory of deterrence, which was coined by Jeffrey
Bekejikian, provides a suitable model for evaluating threats from highly credible to
highly incredible. Hence, this scale would definitely guide decision-makers to make
the right decisions based on actual capabilities and accurate calculation of costs and
precise assessment of threats’ credibility, (Bekejikian, 2002). Such a scaling of threats
that is based on the variants of coercive diplomacy, presented by Alexander George,
which includes classic ultimatums that integrate three main elements: a demand, sense
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of urgency and threat of punishment; tacit ultimatums that succeed when conveyed
deliberately and effectively, or positive assurances/concessions, (George, 2009),
would help the defector in calculating the credibility of threats. When it applies to the
AI sphere, rivals would mutually deter each other not only because of uncertainty and
credibility of threats, but also the fact that neither of them would gamble the status
quo even when the estimated outcomes of defection are higher than the status quo,
(Bekejikian, 2002).

It is also significant to study the psychological factor in the decision-making process
since AI requires humans to be out of the loop. The psychological aspect contributed
to the effectiveness of deterrence as it was the case in nuclear deterrence, precisely the
Cuban Missile Crisis which was an ideal example of general deterrence that
exemplifies rivals’ satisfactions with the status quo. The psychological aspect would
be non-existent in AI to AI interactions. This tells that AI could be disadvantageous in
crisis management as some crisis require more time to be resolved diplomatically, (AI
and the Military, 2019). This further implies AI to AI interactions could increase the
probability of war that might produce unexpected outcomes, thereby increasing
uncertainty and yielding strategic surprises, (AI and the Military, 2019). Such an
observation is based on the embryonic capabilities of AI military applications and the
mainstreamed assumption about the impossibility of developing AI applications
capable of analyzing and reporting all diplomatic endeavors and efforts, (AI and the
Military, 2019). Theoretically speaking, this conclusion is convincing, but practically
speaking, it tackled the issue from one angle and overlooked the other angle which is
the participation of humans in strategic decision-making. When humans are over-theloop, in spite of the high potential of data manipulation and errors, the psychological
factor would be prominent in the anticipated AI deterrence. The IR literature
regrettably overlooked all possibilities and scenarios while investigating the effects of
technological advancement on security.

Hence, AI could exacerbate the security dilemma amid the ongoing arms race in the
commercial sphere, banning AI, as some scholars suggested, is highly unlikely. The
literature has debated over the legality of AI weapons and the potentiality of banning
AI itself or solely banning AI in military applications. As Glaser claimed cooperation
is possible under the security dilemma when offense-defense variables are segregated
and when states have knowledge about motives and intentions of an adversary,
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(Glaser, 1997). The IR literature should cooperate with the AI literature to regulate
R&D in AI, on one hand and to lay out a legal framework for governing AI in
military applications, on the other. Although, drafting an NPT-like agreement or
regulating it is very hard to achieve, Glaser argued that drafting arms control
agreements is the best desirable solution, (Glaser, 1997) given that they would
promote mutual restraints, (Glaser, 1997).

Since AI is currently seen as a new frontier for Weapons of Mass Destruction, it is
worth considering whether a scenario of Mutually Assured Destruction could evolve,
and whether, like during the Cold War and the post-Cold War, mutual kill via AI
(Jervis, 2009), would lead to deterrence or intensify tensions between superpowers,
(Lebow et al, 1995).

Kenneth Waltz’s argument, which sees that nuclear deterrence focuses on the ability
to cause damage to the aggressor rather completely defeating it concurs with Jervis
and Schelling’s views of nuclear deterrence, (Waltz, 2009). Despite Kenneth’s
viewpoint regarding the elimination of the essentials of war-fighting on account of
nuclear deterrence is worthy of consideration, (Waltz, 2009) his argument about the
elimination of the elements of defense was misleading given that nuclear weapons
have made mutual fear intense. As Jervis noted nuclear deterrence has created general
stability due to the alterations in political values of wars and the advert changes in
states’ perceptions, intentions and motivations, (Jervis, 2009). General stability,
therefore, ascertains that nuclear weapons may help in maintaining peace between
rivals by dissuading them to overturn the status quo even when they have the
motivation, (Jervis, 2009). In addition, general stability has negated the view saying
that nuclear weapons did not preclude non-nuclear states to carry out escalatory acts,
(Quackenbush, 2011). The opponents of nuclear deterrence have disregarded how the
imbalance of power exacerbates the security dilemma. This additionally manifests
that nuclear superiority is a destabilizing factor and does not guarantee a decisive
military victory, (Mohan, 1989). Hence, nuclear deterrence, in contrast to the views of
staunch opponents of deterrence, has proved to be empirically fruitful because it has
precluded enormously destructive wars and has maintained stability in times of
conflicts and peacetime.
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Given that Mutually Assured Destruction, an offshoot of nuclear deterrence, was
acclaimed by IR scholars, AI-MAD could be a workable strategy since the literature
debates over the applicability of MAD in the cyber sphere.

The chief essence of MAD is the vulnerability of both sides to retaliation with the
possibility of launching a second-strike capability, (Mohan, 1989). Therefore, such
mutual vulnerability and mutual fears had contributed to the success of general
deterrence when the Cuban Missile Crisis erupted by pushing the leaders of the two
superpowers towards a settlement rather than pushing them to a severe confrontation,
(Lebow, 1995). Accordingly, the more nuclear capabilities, the higher possibility of
effective deterrence since each side will be deterred due to the uncertainty over the
devastating consequences of a second-strike, (Mohan, 1986). The use of general
deterrence at the peak of the Cuban Missile Crisis attributed to the prevention of a
catastrophe as it influenced the risk of war. This further implies that deterrence was
rather effective because of the asymmetry of interests and nuclear parity rather than
nuclear superiority, (Lebow, 1995). This likewise proves that deterrence is a viable
strategy since it promotes leaders to refrain from war and to accept the status quo
when it is proved to be the best-case scenario.

Therefore, the AI literature should posit how a Cuban Missile Crisis similar incident
in the AI could happen and what could generate mutual fears: would it be mutual
disruption of cities, machines, cyber systems or overkill? The Cuban Missile Crisis
was between two superpowers but if a Cuban Missile Crisis incident took place at the
regional level, would asymmetry in technology promote regional adversaries gone AIMAD? Since the psychological factor played a crucial role in the Cuban Missile
Crisis, could human intervene in a state’s offset strategy to assist AI weapons and
killer robots to pinpoint the right targets when it applies to the AI realm? The AI
literature should also investigate the implications of AI when humans are out-of-theloop and when they are over-the-loop, as well as identifying which scenario would be
the most destructive since MAD is centered on “the indivisibility of control”,
(Fairbanks, 2004). In addition to that, the AI literature should make a comparable
study on the implications of AI and the severity of the security dilemma based on a
state’s dependence on technology and a state’s military capabilities.
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While the term “Mutually Assured Deletion/Delibitation” has become trendy in the IR
literature, some argued that the first-strike is favorable in the cyber realm. So, if the
first-strike becomes a preferable option and offense is dominant in the cyber sphere,
AI-MAD

could

be

a

substitute

for

the

so-called

“Mutually

Assured

Deletion/Delebitation” since massive destruction could be the logical outcome either
through the eruption of a conventional war, cyber warfare or even a nuclear war.
Though Fairbanks proclaimed that “damage limitation” was not the main goal of
nuclear MAD, (Fairbanks, 2004), today’s MAD could be overwhelmed by “damage
limitation” since current capabilities have surpassed human control. However, this
does not necessarily mean that AI regulations should not be merely concerned with
the damage limitation since the severity of damage could be grimmer, as opposed to
other types of warfare.

The superiority of AI capabilities over cyber ones is also debatable. Some argued that
AI capabilities could overturn cyber ones since they could discover vulnerabilities in
other cyber defense systems and exploit them, (Horowitz et al, 2018). The flipside of
utilizing AI capabilities is enhancing a state’s cyber defense system by patching
vulnerabilities in its own cybersecurity systems, thereby protecting its system from
AI-enabled cyberattacks, (Horowitz et al, 2018). By the same token, AI could tighten
disinformation by disseminating fake propaganda at a large scale, and could also
counter disinformation through the utilization of bots and algorithms for detecting,
analyzing, disrupting, vetting, blocking and filtering false/unauthentic data, (Horowitz
et al, 2018). AI would be an effective tool for intelligence by gathering a tremendous
amount of data, albeit it could be vulnerable to counter AI-spoofing, (Horowitz et al,
2018). Thus, AI triggers the security dilemma and demonstrates “mutual
vulnerability”, which further implies that defense could be dominant. This further
illustrates that self-deterrence would be successful since weaker actors can
circumvent disparities by using other capabilities and inflicting a political pain,
(Wasser et al, 2018). This, additionally, demonstrates that offense could be dominant
in case of disparity and the lack of nuclear capabilities.

Besides to mutual vulnerability and collateral damage, AI-MAD is highly plausible
since AI applications could have strategic implications over a state’s military,
economic and information superiority, as well as its nuclear superiority. AI-enabled
applications would change the balance of power between developed and developing
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countries, notably with the mammoth utilization of the 3D printing technology (which
is also known as additive manufacturing {AM}) that will facilitate the development of
highly disruptive and speedy technologies, and will accelerate weapons proliferation,
(Johnston et al, 2018). Since Additive Manufacturing is a cheap technology and has
the ability to replicate its applications, (Johnston et al, 2018), AI arms race would be
accelerated. AI MAD is not improbable since machine takeover with its four possible
scenarios could aggravate the security dilemma particularly for networked societies,
(Bouskill et al, 2018).

Resembling to nuclear MAD, the foundations of the anticipated AI-MAD could
include: (i) the indivisibility of control, (ii) mutual fears of retaliation, (iii) severe
destruction, (iv) the psychological factor, (v) parity/disparity, (vi) sparing, (vii) latent
force and (viii) error. Corresponding to cyber MAD, the cores of the propositioned AI
MAD could include: (i) attribution, (ii) costs and (iv) degree of dependence on
technology. Opposed to nuclear and cyber MAD, AI MAD could also investigate the
roles of humans and machines in a military’s command and control.

To sum up, the literature should focus on the potential destructiveness of AI amid the
massive use of cyber capabilities; find ways to ameliorate the security dilemma, and it
should also consider if MAD applies to AI technology.
Conceptual Framework:
Since both cyber and IR literature claim that cyber threats could overcome AI
capabilities, this paper will build upon the argument supporting the overpowering
potential and future prospects of AI while considering the arguments that discredit the
potentialities of AI applications versus cyber capabilities. This paper will explore the
possible implications of AI on both cyber and nuclear capabilities. It will also tackle
the direct proportion between both cyber-offensive and cyber-defensive capabilities,
and nuclear capabilities in relation to AI capabilities.

The Security Dilemma Triad:
AI Capabilities
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Cyber Capabilities

Nuclear Capabilities

Towards this end, this paper develops a “Security Dilemma Triad” composing of
three main elements: cyber, AI, and nuclear capabilities. Based on the security
dilemma triad, this paper will address the relationship between AI and cyber
capabilities on the one hand, and the relationship between AI and nuclear capabilities
on the other, as well as the relationship between nuclear and cyber capabilities with
the presence of AI capabilities.

Therefore, four possible scenarios will be developed to investigate whether offense or
defense will be dominant as follows:
(A) When a state possesses nuclear capabilities + AI capabilities + cyber
capabilities = defense is dominant;
(B) When a state does not possess nuclear capabilities, but possesses AI
capabilities + cyber capabilities = offense is dominant;
(C) When a state possesses nuclear capabilities + cyber capabilities but does not
possess AI capabilities = defense is dominant;
(D) When a state possesses nuclear capabilities + AI capabilities but lacks cyber
capabilities = defense is dominant.

This paper presumes that defense is dominant under the first scenario given that AI
capabilities can overcome cyber capabilities, thereby disavowing the argument of
nuclear vulnerability against cyberattacks. Following the second scenario, offense is
dominant given that nuclear deterrence is ineffective or absent, while AI capabilities
could empower cyber capabilities by attacking points of weakness in the cyber
system. Under the third scenario, defense is also dominant, in spite of the lack of AI
capabilities, due to nuclear deterrence. Finally, for the fourth scenario, defense is
dominant because a state possesses nuclear weapons that maintain a second-strike
capability.
The rationale behind developing the abovementioned scenarios and the “Security
Dilemma Triangle/Triad” is questioning how AI could change states’ perceptions in
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terms of cyber and nuclear capabilities/doctrines. It will, initially, investigate the AI
offense-defense dominance. Then, the implications of AI on both the cyber/nuclear
offense-defense dominance will be covered. It will subsequently borrow the elements
of nuclear Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) (please see annex 1) as variables.
AI Offense Defense Dominance:
It is logic to start with exploring the dominance of either offense or defense in the AI
realm before investigating the prospects of an AI MAD. By virtue of the declining
role of humans in the AI sphere, it is prudent to hypothesize two scenarios for the
application of AI in the military sphere: (i) humans have a minimal control over AI
applications; (ii) human supervision over AI applications is absent. Based on that, this
piece presumes that AI favors a second-strike capability, (Schneider, 2018).
Notwithstanding, the impossibility of defining a machine’s accountability in violation
of the Law of Armed Conflicts and the Geneva Conventions makes an offensive AI
strike advantageous. This does not necessarily mean that offense is dominant in AI.
On the contrary, defense is dominant in AI when humans maintain control over
machines. On the other hand, AI could favor offense when human control is
absent and when a military’s command and control is digitally-dependent on
cyber capabilities.

The Implications of AI in Terms of the Element of MAD:
Based on that conclusion, the following section will cover the implications of AI on
both nuclear and cyber capabilities in order to investigate the offense-defense
dominance in the abovementioned scenarios:
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Drawing on the above mentioned, the possession of other sorts of military
capabilities, such as conventional, nuclear and cyber, in tandem with AI ones helps
states to take the situation from different angles. These angles could be: (i) AI
capabilities have no implications over other capabilities and vice versa, (ii) other
capabilities could bolster a state’s position when it possesses highly advanced AI
software and applications, (iii) other types of military capabilities are valuable, if a
state possesses amateur AI software, or (iv) other military capabilities are invaluable,
if a state possesses advanced AI applications. This in turn helps states to see if small
AI arsenals could create a MAD-like structure with the possession of other military
capabilities. Perhaps, small AI arsenals could deter states from launching a
preemptive or preventive strike.

Hereafter, the paper supposes that mutual AI deterrence could be established between
two nuclear states. While, asymmetric deterrence might operate between a nonnuclear state and a nuclear state since the non-nuclear state would be deterred from
launching a first military strike because of the adversary’s superiority with the
possession of nuclear and fully autonomous AI applications. Though, it might employ
asymmetric capabilities instead to deter its adversary from launching a preemptive AI
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or a conventional strike. For the superior state, it could resort to offensive warfighting
rather than depleting its nuclear arsenal that could be neutralized by AI.
Methodology:
To explore the potential impact of AI on the security dilemma, I interviewed policy
makers, and experts in the field, in addition to an extensive review of the secondary
literature on the weaponization of AI.
Interviews included: personal and phone interviews with a security expert/military
advisor, two university professors, two ambassadors and a researcher as follows:
(i)

Dr/General Mahmoud Khalaf, advisor at Nasser Military Academy;

(ii)

Dr Dalal Mahmoud Al-Sayed, a professor of political science at Faculty of
economic and Political Science at Cairo University and Nasser Military
Academy;

(iii)

Dr Waleed Rashad, assistant professor at the National Center for Social
and Criminological Research;

(iv)

Ambassador Karim Haggag, professor of practice at the American
University in Cairo;

(v)

Ambassador Aly Erfan; Program Director at the School of Global Affairs
and Public Policy at the American University in Cairo;

(vi)

Mona Soliman, doctoral candidate at the Faculty of economic and Political
Science at Cairo University and a researcher at International Politics
Journal (Al-Siyasa Al-Dawleeya).

Variables and Investigation Methods: (please see annex2)
To investigate the four scenarios mentioned in the conceptual framework, the
dependent variables include: dependence on technology, sparing, latent
violence and the demonstrative aspect, expected utility and cost-benefit
analysis, calculus of war, balance of power, relatively of power and
comparison of military and non-military capabilities, parity/disparity, margin of
error, levels of communication, intentions, scope of human role in the
decision-making process, degree of control over machines, indivisibility of
command and control systems, attribution and counterforce.

In addition,

geography and population will be considered to see their impacts on a state‟s
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strategic depth. These dependent variables will help in observing variations
based on the two independent variables which are: (i) human-over-the-loop,
(De Spiegeleire, S et al) and (ii) human-out-of-the-loop, (Russell S. J et al,
2010). Accordingly, it hypothesized two scenarios for AI deterrence, as either
successful or failed, based on the degree of human control over machines,
the degree of dependence on technology and the impacts of AI applications
on nuclear and cyber policies.

Findings:
What is Artificial Intelligence?
The definition of Artificial Intelligence is originated from the definition of
intelligence which is defined as an agent’s computational ability to perform tasks and
achieve goals in different environment. Based on that, Artificial Intelligence is
defined as a machine’s ability to replicate humans’ mental skills and behaviors,
namely pattern recognition, reasoning and neuro-linguistic programming (NLP), and
to learn by experience, as well as being able to adapt to environment and changes, (De
Spiegeleire, S, et al). The US Defense Science Board defined AI as the computation
of tasks such as decision-making, perception and conversation, which are used to be
exclusively done by humans, (De Spiegeleire, S, et al). Such a definition of AI
illustrates that computation and automation are associated with thought processes,
reasoning, behaviors, ideals, and fidelity and dependability of human performance,
(Russell et al, 2010).
Thus, the core of AI technology is the mimicry of human characteristics
autonomously, (Tweedie, 2017). AI technology entails (i) expert systems, (ii)
machine learning, (iii) natural-language processing, and (iv) AI planning, (Tweedie,
2018).

The AI literature has generated three types of AI, mirroring the evolution of AI
throughout the past decades: (i) Artificial Narrow Intelligence (ANI): It is a sort of
technology that mimics a narrow range of human behavior/intelligence. It is a
sophisticated technology, albeit it cannot develop codes; (ii) Artificial General
Intelligence (AGI): It is a more sophisticated technology as opposed to Narrow
Artificial Intelligence since it emulates a wider range of human behaviors. It is a type
of technology that mimics human intelligence as if they are made by humans; (iii)
Artificial Super Intelligence (ASI): It transcends human intelligence, (Tweedie,
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2017). Artificial Super Intelligence, as per AI developers’ speculations, is expected to
nullify and end the exclusivity of human intelligence, (Tweedie, 2018).

The Possible Implications of AI on Other Military Capabilities (Nuclear and Cyber):

A. Cyber Capabilities:
Cyber capabilities are a sort of capabilities and assets that a state can possess to use
them in the conventional, commercial, nuclear, logistical, military and etc to resist
possible attacks or project influence in cyberspace, (Craig, 2018). Both defensive and
offensive capabilities shape a state’s influence since they can be employed as active
or latent, (Craig, 2018).
Today’s cybersecurity systems’ challenges and vulnerabilities are manifold.
Cybersecurity systems are usually attacked through a chain of attacks starting with the
reconnaissance, weaponizing, the delivery phase and ending with the exploit phase,
(Wirkuttis et al, 2017). What is more important, the challenges associated with
gathering cyber intelligence, inter alia, the need to constant adaptation with the
massive amount of heterogeneous data that flows exponentially; the inadequacy of
intrusion detection prevention systems that either defines malware by detecting
abnormal patterns or outlines patterns of normal and recognized networks, (Wirkuttis
et al, 2017).

Based on such a cursory investigation, offense seems dominant, according to the
tenets of the classical offense-defense theory, for plenteous reasons, of which, the
constant progress in offensive capabilities over defensive ones and the increasing
defensive vulnerabilities, (Locatelli, 2013), including the confidentiality, integrity and
availability of data, (Abel Moneim, 2018) as well as the asymmetric nature of
cyberwarfare, (Lindsay, 2013). Resembling to nuclear ambiguity, constructive
ambiguity is a chief essence of cyber warfare, (Al-Daweek, 2018). But with the
massive production of AI applications, such a conclusion needs further investigation
since AI could sharpen or mitigate the cybersecurity dilemma which refers to the use
of offensive, defensive or commingled cyber tools by states amid the absence of
shared cyber norms, (Hennessey, 2017). By the same token, the weaponization of Big
Data and the usage of off-the-shelf technology also tighten the cybersecurity dilemma
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since governments have opportunity to create databases of every single member in the
opponents’ militaries, (Layton, 2018).

The utilization of AI capabilities in the cyber realm has two poles. AI with its
predictability and automation, could mitigate the cyber security dilemma and could
enhance cyber defense by addressing underlying challenges and vulnerabilities in the
cyber ecosystem. Thus, AI capabilities would enhance the effectiveness of the
Integrated Security Approach” (ISA); a holistic approach encompasses earlywarnings; the selection and the adoption of the most adequate countermeasures to
deter possible cyberattacks; the detection of potential attacks in case of failing to
prevent a cyberattack, and adequate responses, (Wirkuttis et al, 2017). AI, with its
offensive and defensive capabilities, has exhibited its ability to enhance cybersecurity
by pinpointing and patching inherent vulnerabilities in cyber defense systems, while
probing, manipulating and spoofing those of adversaries, (King et al, 2018), as well as
detecting software bugs and performing responsive and defensive actions such as selfpatching, thereby deterring cyberattacks at early stages, (Artificial Intelligence (AI)
Enabled Cyber Defense).

While, the negative pole of AI is exemplified in a new bunch of AI applications
capable of evading cyber defense systems and remaining dormant till detecting their
targets, such as the Stuxnet, (Menn, 2018), as well as masking the identity of a
malware after observing and figuring out how adversarial defense systems detect
malware and malicious codes and what they are detecting, (Goosen et al, 2018). Also,
data diet and algorithms biasness are archetypically the Cassandra of misbehaving
algorithms, (Osoba et al, 2017). Heavy reliance on robots and technology increase
warriors’ vulnerability to information attacks by spoofing, denial-of-service,
eavesdropping and exploitation, (Kott et al, 2015).

Ostensibly, the use of AI in the cyber realm is a double-edged sword. It enhances
cyber security and cyber deterrence, at the meantime it intensifies cyber proliferation.
The proliferation of advanced cyber capabilities could serve a state’s strategic
purposes through coercion, and could be useful for employing brute force which helps
a state to achieve its purposes at the tactical level through kinetic or non-kinetic
cyberattacks, (Liff, 2012). Cyberattacks allow states to extract meaningful
concessions from adversaries, undermining their abilities to retaliate or defend
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themselves with conventional or cyber capabilities, (Liff, 2012). On the backdrop of
this vignette, the threat of cyberwarfare, coupled with AI capabilities, could be an
expedient deterrent tool and a practical brute force measure against superior
adversaries that possess highly advanced conventional weapons, (Liff, 2012). Also,
AI proliferation deter states in the cyber plane since every single application has its
counter application, (Rashad, 2019) thereby making it useless.

AI, despite boosting cyber defense, states employs AI with varying degrees for cyber
deterrence, (Rashad, 2019). Hence, the aim of preemptive cyber deterrence, in certain
cases, is demonstrating the ability to disrupt or penetrate security systems rather than
inflicting complete destruction, and having access to sensitive data, (Rashad, 2019).
This illustrates that cyber deterrence is usually based on calculus.

b) Nuclear Capabilities:

The rapid advancement in AI raises a question over the survivability and the
resilience of nuclear systems; the ability to resist or circumvent attacks and the
aptitude to penetrate defenses of nuclear arsenals, (Payne et al, 2017) The mundane
marriage between AI and nuclear weapons coupled with full autonomy and the
absence of human from nuclear decision-making is two-folded. It might upend the
subtle strategic balance among nuclear states, (Groll, 2018), triggering catastrophic
repercussions and cascading tensions between nuclear states on one hand and a nonnuclear state and a nuclear one, on the other.

The cons of AI capabilities on nuclear deterrence involve the vulnerability of nuclear
weapons to robust models of cyber-enabled attacks aimed at disrupting machine
learning, thereby undermining their survivability, (Brown, 2018). Such a tragic flaw
in the AI system, while providing opportunities for mitigating cyber vulnerabilities,
could also undermine nuclear safety and reliability since nuclear weapons depend on
real-time information exchange for targeting, (Unal, 2018). Further, full automation
wherein humans are out-of-the-loop would definitely have knock-on implications on
strategic stability, cascading escalatory acts and triggering arms race, (Unal, 2018).
On account of automation and the digitalization of militaries, false assessments and
responses by algorithms inserted in nuclear weapons systems, which could be labelled
as machine error, could create operational hazards notably for digitally-independent
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states that would make wrongful decisions based on unreliable and inaccurate data,
(Unal, 2018). Critically important, AI could make the “no first use” policy of less
merit because of accidental errors, (Boulanin, 2018).

There are arrays of risks associated with the digitalization of nuclear command and
control systems (C2) which include the possibility of disrupting means of
communication, thus putting the reliability of data assessment on a shaky ground,
(Unal, 2018). In a similar way, the Integrated Threat warning/Assessment structure
which depends on a number of nodes, namely intelligence centers, the missile
warning center, ground-and-space-based assets, could be irreliable since the means of
communication could be compromised and manipulated, (Unal, 2018). “AI could
undermine system stability (C2 and early-warning)”, (Haggag, 2019). It could also
“undermine nuclear strategic stability because of its asymmetrical way” by
undermining its physical system that supports a nuclear command and control system,
(Haggag, 2019).

A striking claim forestalls that AI could sharpen the nuclear second-strike capability.
Despite its peculiarity, it could be true, according to an expert on general adversarial
networks, when states resort to adversarial manipulation attacks for dissuading
adversaries from tracking their nuclear arsenals, (Giest et al, 2018).

Correspondingly to the pros of AI to cyber deterrence, AI could tighten nuclear
weapon systems by boosting detection capabilities, improving early-warning systems,
empowering humans to carry out a precise cross-analysis of data, as well as protecting
the nuclear command and control architecture, (Boulanin, 2018). In line with this, a
group of participants in a workshop organized by RAND argued that AI might
address underlying frailties in the nuclear arms control regime and might lay out
novel foundations of arms control, (Giest et al, 2018).

Paradoxically, it could intensify arms race and could push nuclear states to modernize
their nuclear arsenals due to escalatory acts by nuclear and non-nuclear states,
(Boulanin, 2018).

C) Nuclear Versus Cyber:
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From a technical perspective, cyber capabilities menace nuclear weapons since
cyberattacks could agile nuclear command and control when it is unprotected and
when cyber resilience is not effective, coupled with human error and fallibility. In
addition, AI, through adversarial manipulation, could send false signals or transfer
fake information to counter cyberattacks on nuclear facilities. Still, AI helps improve
defense systems, including the nuclear ones.

The paramount argument saying that AI might undermine nuclear deterrence and
trigger nuclear war needs to be revisited. On contrary, from a purely technical view,
AI capabilities could overturn cyber vulnerabilities and mitigate their negative side
effects on nuclear capabilities, if they are well-protected, (Al-Sayed, 2019) and highly
advanced. Dr/General Mahmoud Khalaf; Nasser Academy Military advisor, asserted
that AI has nothing to do with nuclear deterrence. Yet, he acknowledged the negative
impacts of AI on nuclear command and control systems, counterforce and
survivability from a technical angle.

Thus, based on political realities, cyber

capabilities have failed to revoke nuclear deterrence.

Nuclear vulnerabilities put states under a dilemma of pursuing cyber offense or cyber
defense. Such a dilemma is a normal byproduct of the inherent uncertainty over the
survivability and the reliability of nuclear systems that could be silently compromised
and infiltrated through dormant and stealth campaigns. Therefore, a state may be
incognizant of, in times of peace, the infiltration of its nuclear system for days,
months or years which in turn deleteriously affects its military decision-making,
deterrence policy, security doctrine, (Unal, 2018) and nuclear posture. In times of
war, the situation is quite different given that it may result in information asymmetry,
thereby triggering a retaliatory attack based on faulty calculations, (Unal, 2018).

In response, the emergence of AI technology could ameliorate such a dilemma by its
detective and predicative capabilities. AI, as an assistive tool, could help leaders to
make righteous decisions. Also, cyber intrusion, hacking of critical nuclear facilities
and system failures are very common in nuclear weapons systems, (Unal, 2018). As a
result, states would be dissuaded from using cyber capabilities due to the uncertainty
over the degree of advancement as opposed to their adversaries. Correspondingly,
attackers would be dissuaded from attacking adversarial nuclear arsenals. This
illustrates, as Dr Waleed Rashad; assistant professor at the National Center for Social
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and Criminological Research, humans are critical in nuclear policy as they act as
rational beings, (Rashad, 2019).

AI + Cyber + Nuclear:
To sum up, technical-wise, AI could undermine nuclear deterrence, especially when
humans are absent, but politically speaking, the AI technology cannot overturn
nuclear deterrence as long as there is a meaningful degree of human control.
Analysis:
Even with the lack of empirical evidences of the destructive potentials of AI military
applications, defining AI is a requisite for investigating how it would reshape
interstate relations and how it would alter the foundations of the international peace
system.

The IR scholars and international lawyers have narrowly focused on the destructive
potentials of AI and its autonomous potentials without defining its nature. They,
regrettably, mixed up between AI as a technology, precisely as an enabler of a
weapon, and AI as a weapon system per se. They mistakenly assumed that AI can
serve “as a state weapon”, (Haggag, 2019). In fact, “AI is not a weapon”, (Erfan,
2019), but a technology that can be bolted into a weapon system and that “can serve
as an enabler for cyber and conventional weapons, as well as weapons of mass
destruction”, (Haggag, 2019). It will be very problematic to categorize AI as a
weapon given that equating AI with other weapon systems, such as conventional and
nuclear weapons, would definitely direct the literature to exploring the impacts of AI
per se, while disregarding the possible impacts of AI military applications on other
weapon systems. Hypothetically speaking, if AI had been classified as a weapon, not
a technology, states would have heavily relied on AI, with its highly destructive and
disruptive potentials and its cost-benefit effects, for achieving military targets.
Therefore, the weaponization of AI refers to “the development in the uses of
weapons”, (Khalaf, 2019).
Based on this definition, the weaponization of AI “exacerbates the security dilemma
because it can enhance the military capability of a state in symmetric relations or it
can increase the military disparity between states not only in terms of new capability,
but also in terms of attribution” coupled with the potential of being weaponized by
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non-state actors, (Haggag, 2019). Apart from the legal aspect, the security dilemma
does not only augment because of parity/disparity in capabilities, but also the
uncertainty over “the impacts of using AI on military’s decision-making and the
calculus of war”, (Erfan, 2019). Adding to this, uncertainty over AI applications’
ability to counter-react and respond in the event of sudden attacks, regardless of being
intentional or unintentional, is the core of the security dilemma in the age of
technology.

There is no doubt that the use of AI for military purposes will dramatically change the
calculus of war. Referring to the excessive reliance on drones in lieu of humans for
reducing the number of causalities, Ambassador Aly Erfan sees that AI or any
technological advancement “would make the decision to go to war easy”, (Erfan,
2019). Though, such a view point is partially true at first glance, it omits that
technological advancement could make causalities higher and could also make the
outcomes graver. The use of nuclear weapons during the second World War in 1945
was a perfect example illustrating how technological advancement could be highly
destructive and could trigger high death tolls. This tells destructive outcomes always
dissuade states from rushing into war. And, the whole issue is not only about
causalities, but also cost-benefit effects, interstate relations, legal considerations, state
responsibility, military strength, degree of advancement in technology, geography,
parity/disparity in capabilities, strategic climate, etc. More importantly, mutual
vulnerability, indecisive victory, (Khalaf, 2019) escalatory acts and retaliation are also
foundational in war calculus. The use of AI in militaries adds a new criterion to war
calculus which is the utility of using AI as an enabler of a certain weapon system.

AI in air defense systems is one area to consider how AI could enhance or undermine
the effectiveness of a weapons system. From a purely military perspective,
commanders could assess how would AI allow them to employ air defense systems
effectively and how would it allow them to maneuver and respond in a timely fashion.
AI, for instance, minimizes the time needed for a response from 2 minutes, when
humans are on-the-loop, to 10-20 seconds, when humans are no longer on the loop,
(Khalaf, 2019). As Dr./General Mahmoud Khalaf said, the whole issue is about
choosing and using the most adequate weapon for ensuring a speedy response. In
other words, a states’ commanders should know the type of the weapon used by the
adversary, and should use the most appropriate weapon to respond within no time,
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(Khalaf, 2019). Therefore, a dichotomy does exist between the ability to identify and
detect the advanced weapon used by an adversary, and the ability to respond
effectively and in no time by using the appropriate means/weapons, (Khalaf, 2019).
Therefore, AI and emerging technologies would not make the decision to war easy.

The absence of a threshold for incidents that could be seen as an act of aggression in
the cyber domain, (Erfan, 2019) coupled with the AI’s “dual-use nature and the
potential of weaponizing AI civilian applications”, (Haggag, 2019) further
exacerbates the cyber security dilemma. The dual-use nature of AI could enable an
adversary to manipulate a civilian AI application and change its nature, so as to be
employed for military purposes. As a consequence, the AI security dilemma would be
exacerbated since a state’s commanders and soldiers should be aware of a weapon’s
capability and technology in order to be able to respond effectively. In that case, the
problematic issue of attribution looms over since the defender might be unable to
recognize the real nature of an AI application.

Since AI is typically a development in the use of technology in the military realm, one
could say that it is two-folded given it could enhance both cyber defense and cyber
deterrence, (Rashad, 2019) and could undermine the nuclear policy. Meanwhile, there
is no a determinant proof. Hereafter, as Ambassador Erfan implied, the degree
through which an AI application controls a weapon system is critical in a state’s
calculations.

Most of scholarly debate assumed the inapplicability of cyber deterrence for ample
reasons: (i) cyber space is an open battlefield, thereby it does not exacerbate the
security dilemma, (Al-Sayed, 2019); (ii) the absence of internet governance, (Erfan,
2019). It is true that the absence of internet governance and the difficulty of
establishing attribution, notably when the attacker wants to keep his/her identity
hidden, hinder the efficacy of cyber deterrence in its classical form. But, by enabling
cyber defense systems with AI applications, cyber deterrence will be effectual. From
a technical point of view, AI enhances cyber defense by detecting vulnerabilities in
one’s system and spoofing an adversary’s system. From a political point of view, AI
exacerbates the security dilemma because it is an advanced version of cyber
capabilities, allowing states to mutually penetrate sensitive systems, such as military,
intelligence and critical infrastructure, (Rashad, 2019); collect accurate data, and to
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“have a vivid picture of an adversary’s capabilities”, (Khalaf, 2019). It also reshapes
the balance of power. In an effort to mitigate the cyber security dilemma, states
employ AI, drones and robots in preemptive cyber deterrence, (Rashad, 2019) since
the victim will unilaterally deter itself, (Lonsdale, 2017) in the event of a widespread
disruptive cyberattack that could trigger civilian causalities.
Regarding nuclear capabilities, alarmists’ view point, arguing that AI would threaten
nuclear weapons and would undermine nuclear deterrence, dominates the IR
literature. Theoretically speaking, this view looks awesome because “the nuclear C2
can be violated by cyber capabilities since hackers can hack the typical system of air
mines”, (Erfan, 2019). But, when it comes to nuclear deterrence, it needs further
investigation. First of all, “AI could be used as an enabler in terms of nuclear policy
which includes: targeting, command and control, early-warning, potential battle
damage assessment and the scenarios for establishing attribution”, (Haggag, 2019).
Therefore, from a technical angle, AI can protect nuclear weapons since some of the
AI applications are designed for early-warning and detecting any nuclear
proliferation. Based on that, AI applications can assist humans and decision-makers,
who use skills-based behaviors, in outlining the courses of action in a nuclear policy.
In that case, nuclear deterrence will not be threatened provided that the nuclear
command and control system is well-structured, well-protected and well-defended,
(Erfan, 2019) as well as “defensive measures, including data encryption, are taken”,
(Al-Sayed, 2019). Hence, it is unexpected that AI would change the defensive nuclear
doctrine to a “preemptive” one, as Ambassador Haggag claimed, as long as humans
are over-the-loop. Such an argument could be valid only when fully autonomous
applications are bolted into the nuclear weapon system and when humans maintain no
control over machines.

Though, the AI technology cannot equate any of the known weapon systems, the
devastating potentials of the AI technology can equate those of the nuclear weapons,
(Erfan, 2019). Assuming that an AI application controls a nuclear weapon system, the
scale of destruction will surpass the destructiveness of AI-enabled conventional
weapons, (Erfan, 2019). This argument is convincing when humans are out-of-theloop.

42

As politics speak louder than technicalities, the dichotomy between nuclear weapons
safety and highly advanced cyber capabilities could somehow be mitigated by the use
of AI early-warning applications and a meaningful humans’ supervision.

Offense Versus Defense and the Efficacy of Deterrence in the AI realm:
Theoretically speaking, the malicious use of AI makes offense dominant in the cyber
realm when state A has strong cyber defense systems as opposed to state B which has
weak defense systems. There is no a unified position over the offensive/defensive
nature of AI. Ambassador Erfan, for instance, maintained that AI deterrence could be
feasible, though he implied the difficulty of determining whether offense or defense
will be dominant, (Erfan, 2019). Ambassador Haggag, on the other hand, sees that
“establishing AI deterrence will be more difficult, if not impossible”, because he sees
that deterrence is already difficult in nuclear weapons, (Haggag, 2019). Likewise, Dr.
Dalal Al-Sayed argued that AI deterrence is impossible because of the openness of the
cyber realm, (Al-Sayed, 2019). Ambassador Haggag’s argument about the complex
nature of deterrence shall be spotted-on given that deterrence is based on assumptions
and hypothetical scenarios. Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that
deterrence is impossible in other weapon systems and emerging technologies since
deterrence is a policy/strategy through which states devise scenarios based on the
strategic climate for enhancing their defense. The whole issue of deterrence is “the
political will to deter and having the ability to establish deterrence”, (Khalaf, 2019).

As per the foundations of cyber deterrence, defense would be dominant in the AI
sphere, owing to its penetrative, manipulative and disruptive potentials, (Rashad,
2019). The ability to show muscles in the cyber/AI sphere and the ability to retaliate
and respond in a timely manner make defense dominant. In some cases, states resort
to the cyber sphere and weaponize the Internet of Things (IoT) just for signaling the
vulnerability of adversarial cyber defense systems which in turn deter victims from
launching

offensive

cyberattacks.

This

demonstrates

that

signaling

cyber

vulnerabilities is deterrent in and of itself, (Rashad, 2019).

AI MAD is Feasible: (Please see annex 3)
th

The 20

century Cold War provoked nuclear deterrence and Mutually Assured

Destruction. By the same token, the 21th century Cold war and the intense AI race
could make an AI MAD-like structure probable. However, such a supposition should
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not be taken for granted given that an AI MAD could be a workable strategy only
when humans are having a degree of control over AI applications and when they
participate in the decision-making process, especially at the strategic level.

Scenario One: Humans are out-of-the-loop:

Such a scenario is highly implausible in the foreseeable future, but it should be
considered since AI warfare will be the next war due to its little cost and its
potentiality to trigger few physical causalities, (Soliman, 2019). Accordingly, with the
mechanization of war, this scenario could generate graver outcomes comparable to
the second scenario, to be discussed later. Under this scenario, humans would have no
control over machines and they would also relinquish their monopoly over the
military decision-making process to machines and AI applications. Thus, as Mona
Soliman noted, machines/robots and drones would have a powerful role as opposed to
humans in future wars, (Soliman, 2019). And, human role would be confined to
counting physical and human causalities, (Soliman, 2019). Furthermore, the scale of
destruction could not be estimated and could not be mitigated or even controlled in
case of wrongful attacks or miscalculations. There is no doubt that the use of fully
autonomous AI applications with their high destructive capabilities and the irritability
of C2 systems will definitely change the nature and “the purpose of war in the cyber
sphere from trying to influence an adversary’s calculus to destroying it”, (Al-Sayed,
2019). Thus, offense would be dominant with the absence of the psychological factor.
This further illustrates that a vicious circle of retaliatory attacks (first- and secondstrikes) would be highly probable. Adding to this, the lack of accountability would
further aggravate the situation amid the strict rejection of states to define a cyber
threshold, (Erfan, 2019). Therefore, it would be hard to punish a machine or even
preclude a state responsibility, which also means the failure of deterrence. The failure
of deterrence and indecisive victory would be the logical outcomes since fully
autonomous weapons would take-over other capabilities, causing severe destruction
and disruption.
The difficulty of ensuring machines’ compliance with international law and
international legal norms, the impossibility of fathoming in advance the outcomes of
machine-machine interactions, (Altmann et al, 2017) and the dilemma of attribution
make deterrence more complex and spark crisis instability. Adding to such a gloomy
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scenario, an AI system could preserve itself should it suspected that its halt was
imminent, and could retaliate by launching a nuclear strike, thereby undermining the
doctrine of mutually assured destruction, (Klare, 2019). Also, the deployment of
undersea drones might threaten the second-strike capability, (Klare, 2019).

Hypothetically, the only possible way to make machine-based deterrence effective
under such an extreme scenario is the regular updates of data and occasional oversight
by humans. Ergo, machines are not immune from miscalculations. Under such a very
hypothetical and far-fetched scenario, where machines are in control of fire power and
other weapon systems, ample forms of latent violence could be used as follows: (i)
when AI has been bolted into a nuclear weapon or a WMD, deterrence by punishment
or retaliation would have been effectual, (Erfan, 2019); (ii) when AI has been inserted
into a cyber defense system, deterrence by disruption would have been effective; (iii)
when AI has been used through a conventional weapon, deterrence by punishment
would have been plausible. If such a scenario occurred, would states’ leaders
intervene at the end of the day? There is no a definite answer for such a question since
we are unsure to what extent would machines be able to act like humans.

Scenario Two: Humans are over-the-loop:

Under this scenario, states would remain the main actor given such a highly advanced
AI technology, especially those which are usually developed for military purposes,
cannot be produced or even used by individuals and non-state actors, (Erfan, 2019). It
is true that states would be the main actor under this scenario, but non-state actor,
including companies and terrorist groups, and individuals could use and could
produce AI applications with the technique of addictive manufacturing, as well as
they could “weaponize” AI applications, (Haggag, 2019). Further, the potential of
eclipsing humans’ role would be far-fetched, (Al-Sayed, 2019) since the decision to
go to war would be under the discretion of humans. In the context of human-machine
teaming, AI applications would be active at the tactical and operational levels and
humans would be responsible for strategic decision-making.

From a military perspective, AI deterrence is feasible, with or without the possession
of nuclear weapons, given that states’ leaders will be reluctant to launch a first-strike
because of the fear of unknown. Besides, the ever-intensifying AI race in the
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commercial and military spheres aggravates the inherent dilemma of keeping up pace
by possessing the most advanced AI applications to deter and penetrate adversaries,
and the ability to develop national AI applications. In other words, each state should
possess the most advanced AI applications vis-a-vis its adversary, (Khalaf, 2019).
Unlike other conventional and unconventional military capabilities, AI applications
should be domestically developed, thereby enhancing states’ power and influence,
(Khalaf, 2019). AI warfare is a sort of information warfare whereby triumph always
goes to the one who possesses more data and information, (Khalaf, 2019). AI warfare
is new form of struggle wherewithal competing parties seek to “destroy data”,
(Khalaf, 2019) to paralyze each other and to undermine their choices to respond.
However, this reflects the inherent dilemma in AI-enabled warfare which requires
possessing and collecting more data without being detected to avoid retaliatory acts
that could take place to collect massive data in return, (Khalaf, 2019). In the event of
reciprocated penetration and manipulation of data, victory will be indecisive due to
data neutralization, (Khalaf, 2019). This tells that data neutralization, coupled with the
weaponization of Big Data, triggers neutralization at the battlefield inasmuch as
military commanders are uncertain about the reliability of their weapon systems and
are also unsure of weapons capabilities. This further implies that data neutralization
can also pave the way for weapons neutralization. Therefore, weapons neutralization
can pose a problem at the operational and tactical levels given that the defender
should “respond effectively and in a timely fashion, as well as should choose the most
appropriate weapon to respond”, (Khalaf, 2019).

Because of neutralization and mutual vulnerability, the weaponization of AI could
create deterrence and could maintain strategic stability in symmetric struggles. In
asymmetric conflicts which are usually associated with crisis instability, AI
deterrence could also be viable since cyber force and conventional military force are
not alike, (Rashad, 2019).

Thus, by separating cyber force from other sorts of

military force, “AI could make preemptive deterrence and defense more effective”,
(Erfan, 2019). However, such a classification should not disregard the efficacy of
other sorts of force. One could argue that the efficacy of cyber force could equate and
could go hand in hand with conventional force. It is illogical to confine asymmetric
calculus to the cyber sphere since states are rational. The purpose of deterrence in
asymmetric struggles is usually demonstrating the ability to attack or retaliate without
inflicting massive destruction. Coupled with traditional war calculus, a superior state
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could adopt AI preemptive deterrence to dissuade an adversary from using AI and
such-like capabilities maliciously, whereas, a weak state could adopt cyber deterrence
and develop more cyber capabilities to demonstrate its ability to attack a superior
state. To that end, the defensive doctrine would be complemented with preemption.
Asymmetric deterrence resembles the cat and mouse game where neither the cat nor
the mouse would be able to claim victory.

In short, cost neutralization pushes states to think twice. Accordingly, AI mutually
assured destruction-like structure is feasible since “the purpose is not destruction, but
gaining a political benefit by making the costs of offense very high and intolerable”,
(Khalaf, 2019).

In the context of symmetric and asymmetric conflicts, the defensive doctrine would
be dominant in the AI realm as long as humans could reduce uncertainty and they,
more or less, could open channels of communication to avoid grave destruction of
spared cities and avoid the total disruption of cyber systems and AI-enabled
machines.

By applying this to other weapon systems which can be enabled by AI capabilities, AI
could maintain a second-strike capability amid the growing uncertainty over the
collateral damage that might be triggered by the uncontrollable use of nuclear and
conventional weapons. This further illustrates that AI deterrence would be successful
since states’ leaders are usually driven by security-seeking interests. This also implies
that the foreseen AI MAD structure would go in parallel with nuclear MAD, thereby a
defensive doctrine would be adopted.

To ensure a successful AI deterrence, states should use latent violence and credible
threats to compel and deter adversaries from doing unwanted actions. As
Ambassadors Erfan and Haggag argued, attribution and accountability are
foundational in deterrence, (Erfan, Haggag, 2019). Like nuclear and cyber deterrence,
AI deterrence per se could entail “deterrence by punishment” through the execution of
an AI retaliatory attack, and “deterrence by denial” by the development of more AI
capabilities. On contrary to other deterrence postures, the deterring state could invoke
credible threats by “the threat of disruption to a state’s political, fiscal, power,
weapon, financial, electoral systems,” (Haggag, 2019). As Ambassador Haggag
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noted, AI can disrupt thing of value for punishment or it can deny the use of AI
applications and other capabilities”, (Haggag, 2019). Based on that, nuclear weapons
are not the sole agent of destruction, as Ambassador Haggag claimed, since the
disruption of critical infrastructure could result in complete destruction. AI deterrence
could also include the threat of mass manipulation or penetration, thereby paralyzing
and neutralizing critical systems, especially the weapon systems. Thus, AI deterrence
could be a standalone policy.

However, there are possible scenarios for using latent violence based the type of
weapons and capabilities possessed besides to AI, as follows: (i) when two nuclear
states possess AI capabilities, deterrence by punishment will be employed not only
because of the possession of nuclear weapons, but also the parity in AI capabilities;
(ii) when a nuclear state and a non-nuclear state possess AI capabilities, deterrence by
preempt ion and denial will be effective; (iii)when two non-nuclear states possess AI
and cyber capabilities, deterrence by preemption and denial will be used.

Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, AI, as a weapon enabler, tightens the security dilemma
between states in symmetric and asymmetric conflicts. After the in-depth
investigation, deterrence could be effective and a MAD like structure is probable in
the AI realm because of neutralization and mutual vulnerability. Notwithstanding,
there is no a 100 percent guarantee that leaders won’t miscalculate situations amid the
growing uncertainty and their great reliance on machines that can be manipulated or
neutralized when AI and cyber defense systems are not shielded or amateur. So,
human-machine teaming is essential for having a successful deterrence and
minimizing errors as much as possible. As Dr/General Khalaf suggested that human
intervention would be needed, should a technical error or an intentional error
happened. In that regard, he referred to a well-known western saying “Don’t trust too
much in technology.” He envisions that as long as AI applications are updated and are
scrutinized by humans, on a regular basis, besides to military simulations, wrong war
decisions and miscalculations won’t take place, (Khalaf, 2019).

To conclude, the second scenario is the most possible scenario since deterrence
requires the psychological factor along with rational thinking in war calculus which
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entails military, political and economic aspects. To that end, states will never
relinquish its monopoly over fire power to machines or AI applications.
On the backdrop, the anticipated AI MAD, which could be coined as “Mutually
Assured Manipulation”, could operate in parallel with nuclear MAD. Also, AI MAD
could embolden nuclear MAD when humans are over-the-loop.

Finally, further research should be made to tackle the implications of AI on the
relations between state actors and non-state actors and such asymmetric struggles
which cannot be mitigated amid crisis instability. It is also suggested to do further
research on how the weaponization of outer space, coupled with the possession of AI
capabilities, would threaten deterrence. By the same token, further research should be
done to investigate how AI could shuffle the foundations of international peace and
security, such as the concept of collective security.

Policy Implications:
AI vertical proliferation and hasty AI race instigate instability, thereby exacerbating
the security dilemma and increasing military expenditure with the aim of catching up
capabilities and ensuring arms race stability, (Altmann et al, 2017). AI race has been
augmented for maintaining strategic stability and for preventing the adversary from
being ahead. However, the proliferation of AI should be regulated for maintaining
arms race stability which requires the planned deployments of arms in terms of scope
and pace, (Altmann et al, 2017). Maintaining strategic stability rests on ensuring the
planned development and proliferation of such novel asymmetric capabilities in age
of information and economic warfare.

Though AI exacerbates the security dilemma and accelerates proliferation, AI
provides a potential for confidence-building through the formation of a regime for
arms control and the promotion of disarmament, (Haggag, 2019). Such an anticipated
regime could pave the way for regulating the unplanned deployment of such novel
technologies and AI which in turn spark crisis instability and stimulate arms race,
(Altmann et al, 2017).
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Unsurprisingly, such a fierce commercial competition has been defused to the military
sphere, rendering the development of AI applications that meet the requirements of
the military uses (Altmann et al, 2017). Such a paradigm shift in the rapid
proliferation of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) and AI applications, which do
not require Herculean efforts or exotic materials as opposed to nuclear and
conventional weapons, demonstrates the urgency of regulating the uses of AI and
AWS in the context of the ongoing information warfare, and also indicates the
necessity of controlling AI race in the context of the current economic warfare.

Since Big Data and the Internet of Things have been weaponized, the suggested
regime should put limitations on the weaponization of Big Data which threatens not
only states, but also institutions and individuals, (Rashad, 2019). Also, the 3D printing
or Addictive Manufacturing (AM) technology that allows second-, third-tier states
and non-state actors to develop AI or AWS raises the alarm over the possible
irrational use of AI by non-state actors or individuals. This means that any AI arms
control regime should take all necessary measures and steps to ensure the
inaccessibility of both the 3D printing technology and AI applications to non-state
actors.

Since AI race has evolved in the context of economic rivalries and economic warfare
before being diluted to the military sphere, state actors will no longer have a
monopoly over the ongoing AI race given that the private sector has become a part of
the game. This also means that establishing a regime for regulating the uses of AI and
controlling its race requires the incorporation of multi-stakeholders, including the
private companies which are implicitly competing with state actors and are thriving
for promoting human security. This mirrors the clash between maintaining strategic
stability and a state’s national security on one hand, and promoting human security
and gaining profit on the other. Such ever-intensifying commercial competition
illustrates the underlying dilemma between promoting free-market economy and
maintaining strategic stability, implying the impossibility of regulating AI, (Khalaf,
2019). Dr/General Khalaf was absolutely right when he articulated that regulating
competition is impossible from an economic point of view, but that does not
necessarily mean that regulating AI uses in the commercial, cyber and military
spheres is improbable too, otherwise militaries will always be under the threat of
being neutralized since private companies have the know-how of such applications
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and are aware of their inherent vulnerabilities. The suggested regime could settle this
by promoting the sense of ownership among stakeholders.

Besides to the arms control point, the nexus between maintaining a meaningful human
control and eclipsing humans control could trigger states to alter their military
doctrines and policies. As per the Bob Work; the US deputy Secretary of Defense, the
full delegation of authority to AI and algorithms is highly improbable except for the
cyber realm, (Altmann et al, 2017). However, such an option could not be sustained,
should an adversarial state signaled it willingness to delegate more authority to AIenabled machines, ((Altmann et al, 2017). Consequently, the AI race could be
protracted to the extent of triggering collateral damage. Though, such a signaling to
delegate military’s decision-making to fully autonomous applications deemed
improbable, it is worrisome since AI and AWS cannot act in conformity with the
principles and foundations of international law and the international legal norms,
particularly the International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed Conflicts, as
well as they could increase the incidences of speedy and mechanized wars that cannot
be fathomed or controlled. The mere thinking of a swarm combat triggers crisis
instability since the assumption of high chances of war will takeover, (Altmann et al,
2017). It further increases the likelihoods of escalation, as Paul Scharre implied, there
is no a guarantee for winning a swarm war, unless well-programmed algorithms are
developed and are used, otherwise the outcomes will be disastrous because of timely
counterattacks, (Altmann et al, 2017). If machines have been delegated to make war
decisions, there would have been no chances for practicing restraints or doublechecking, (Altmann et al, 2017). The suggested regime, coupled with international
legal instruments, could address this point by ushering for a meaningful human
control.

The intractability of such a kind of technology makes attribution difficult and
problematic. The inherent difficulty of establishing attribution rests on the inability to
know the attributor since the attributor could be a state, non-state actor or even a
“third party who has interest in the outcomes of any potential crisis, confrontation
with the use of a certain weapon system”. The only possible way for establishing
attribution, apart from those suggestions focusing on the legal perspective, is human
intelligence by which humans can collect data and process them according to the
strategic climate, (Khalaf, 2019). With the establishment of an arms control regime,
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the issue of attribution could be resolved by the development of legally binding
instruments, and the development of political, security and economic frameworks.

Surely, AI arms control does not only pave the way for creating a regime that would
maintain strategic stability within the AI sphere, but also preventing the fall of the AI
technology in the wrong hands by laying out parameters for AI production and AI
arms trade without hindering competition.

Policy Recommendations:
There is no doubt that the AI technology, similarly to nuclear capabilities, has been
weaponized.

Therefore, the stealthy potentials of AI could pose high security

concerns that might reshuffle the world order and might make the parameters of
international peace and security at a shaky ground. In the era of globalization, the
weaponization of AI, without being regulated, would definitely add further hurdles to
strategic stability.

Much as, there is no empirical evidences of destruction triggered by the use of AI in
the military domain, the international community should not wait till an AI Pearl
Harbor, AI Hiroshima and Nagasaki or such-like incidents take place. Is the history
repeating itself? There is no a unified stance on how to manage and regulate the uses
of AI for civilian and particularly military purposes amid the new Cold War.

There are two possible scenarios for regulating AI. Each of those scenarios has its
own parameters and regulatory agenda:
(I)

AI is not a weapon, but a technology that can alter a weapon’s technology,
(Erfan, 2019) and can be integrated into numerous military systems,
(Concluding Report, 2018). Thus, the supposition of drafting additional
protocol to the Convention on Conventional Weapons for banning AI
seems irrelevant. In such a scenario, it is worthy of consideration to see
how the foreseen AI arms control regime would shape the nuclear and
cyber arms control regimes. More important, the issue of accountability
and state responsibility should be considered in that regard;
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(II)

AI and such kinds of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), such
as submarines drones, are coined as weapons. In that regard, they should
be prohibited, (Geist, 2016). In that case, an additional protocol to the
Conventional on Conventional Weapons should be drafted for banning AI
and LAWS.

The first policy option is the doable one. Therefore, the international community
should take the following measures to incrementally formulate a multilateral regime
for regulating AI, as it was the case with nuclear weapons:
1) National AI and Cyber Policies: According to the “routine activity” theory
which articulates that individuals, institutions and states unilaterally deter
themselves/itself when the threats associated with technological advancement
are growing, (Rashad, 2019), states should draft national laws for regulating
the AI and cyber activities based on the degree of advancement and the degree
of dependence on technology, (Rashad, 2019).
2) Drafting Bilateral Agreements: Resembling to nuclear weapons, states are
recommended to sign such-like START agreements for managing the uses of
AI applications; defining a threshold for cyber and AI attacks, and information
and technology sharing, as well as strengthening cyber and AI defensive
measures at the bilateral level.
Such bilateral agreements could open the room for the evolvement of a legal
norm.
3) Super-soft Law for AI: Similar to nuclear restraint, AI restraint could pave
the way for managing, regulating or containing the development of AI for
military uses, (Maas, 2019). Such a bottom-up law-making approach, which
necessitates the incorporation all actors and stakeholders (INGOs, scientists,
academia, security experts, developers and individuals), could come out with
non-binding speculative rules and regulations, (Burri, 2017). However, such
non-binding speculative rules and regulations could be the stepping stone for
legally binding rules. They could also set redlines for AI-enabled attacks, such
as AI-enabled nuclear strikes, thus establishing an AI taboo.
4) Promoting AI Arms Control Rather Than Non-Proliferating It: We
cannot reverse or ban the AI technology and lethal autonomous weapons
systems, (LAWS) as Schultz articulated “Proliferation begets proliferation”,
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(Maas, 2019). Since the AI technology is not unlawful but its malicious uses,
(Cavelty, et al, 2017) all we can do is regulating its uses and circumscribing its
lethality through the drafting of a multilateral agreement. Reaching an
agreement regulating the uses of AI, more or less, illustrates states’ acceptance
to regulate AI and its uses inasmuch as they will hold a monopoly over the use
of AI for military purposes, (Erfan, 2019).
Mindful that, vague legal terms, such as the term “control” could be
interpreted differently and loosely by states based on their preferences, (Burri,
2017). This illustrates that tight and precise legal terms should be used.
Further, preventive prohibition seems convincible since it would neither
prohibit the technology itself nor add restrictions on quantitative proliferation
of AI applications, but the prohibition of certain military practices, (Altmann
et al, 2017). Thus, a legally-binding multilateral agreement, comprehensively
outlawing certain uses of AI, is highly recommended in that regard.

5) Drafting a Multilateral Agreement for Regulating AI: Such an agreement
shall be drafted based on the foreseeable AI norms and in conformity with
international legal instruments. In addition, it shall include clause(s) on:
a) Meaningful Degree of Humans’ Control and Keeping Humans
Over-the-loop: Based on the foregoing analysis, a degree of a human
control over a machine is essential for commanding and controlling
the course of war, otherwise the outcomes will be disastrous. Humans
can act as operators, (Autonomous Weapons & Human Control, 2016)
under the context of human-machine teaming, so as to manage the
course of war at the operational, tactical and strategic levels. They can
also be moral agents by weighting the degree of collateral damage that
might be trigged by the excessive or inadequate use of force,
(Autonomous Weapons & Human Control, 2016). The whole issue is
not only about maintaining a meaningful degree of human control, but
also making human control on par with and in conformity with the
principles of military necessity, proportionality, distinction, etc, and
addressing the issues of controllability, moral responsibility and
accountability, (Horowitz et al, 2015). To ensure a meaningful human
control, it essential to meet three core requirements: (i) making
informed decisions about the usage of weapons, (ii) having sufficient
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information and maintaining a situational awareness of the course of
war, so as to ensure the legality of actions, and (iii) training humans
on how to control and use weapons effectively after being tested,
(Horowitz et al, 2015). Adding to this, conducting regular updates of
AI applications, (Rashad, Khalaf, 2019) is a pre-requisite for
maintaining a meaningful degree of human control. The suggested
clause(s) should also stipulate for defining “a meaningful control” as:
“control by design” by which the operator has the ability to monitor
information about the context and system, and “control in use”
through which the operator monitors the operational environment and
the system to ensure compliance with IHL, (Concluding Report,
2018).
b) The Uses of AI: Resembling to nuclear weapons, we cannot stop or
reverse the development of AI. Then, AI should be regulated and
humans should be hold accountable in the AI domain, (Erfan, 2019).
By regulating AI, it means the regulation of its uses and regulating the
conducts of states, individuals, companies and the international
community in the AI sphere, (Erfan, 2019). Lucas argued that the use
of LAWS in uninhabited areas and against unmanned targets makes it
lawful, (Cavelty, 2017). Needless to say, AI regulations should entail
the prohibition of certain applications and the permitting of others,
(Erfan, 2019). Further, AI regulations should outline what humans can
do and what they cannot do in the AI domain.
Since states, according to Article 36 of the Additional Protocol of the
1977 Geneva Convention, are obliged to determine whether a certain
use of a weapon be seen as a violation by international law or not,
(Cavelty, 2017), it is highly suggested to add a clause stressing on that
obligation. To this end, the suggested clause should require every state
to take the following into consideration: (i) the characteristics of a
weapon and its technology, (ii) the context in which LAWS are used
i.e: remote or populated areas, (Lewis, 2013), (iii) the military targets,
(iv) the level and degree of residual human control over the LAWS,
(Cavelty, et al, 2017).
c) Accountability and Moral Responsibility: In the event of
malfunction, hacking, miscalculations or inadequate use of force in
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violation of IHL and the Law of Armed Conflicts, the issues of
accountability and liability loom over given that it is hard to hold
machines liable and it will be unfair to inflict liability upon
commanders or programmers in that case, (Fournier, 2018). It will
also be impossible to hold a manufacturer accountable given he/she is
not a subject of the International Criminal Law which only prosecutes
individuals, particularly states’ leaders. Adding to the further muddied
situation, states cannot be prosecuted according to the “doctrine of
sovereign immunity” even it has been proved that states were
responsible for using autonomous weapon systems, (Fournier, 2018).
Because of sovereign immunity, certain states have extended
sovereignty to manufacturer, (Fournier, 2018), thereby prosecuting
manufacturers will be almost impossible. Thus, the international
community should not afford machines to make war decisions without
holding someone accountable, (Erfan, Haggag, Rashad, 2019). This
illustrates that when humans are over-the-loop, perpetrators and
programmers should be held accountable according to international
law and a state responsibility shall be claimed.
d) AI/Cyber Red Lines: All stakeholders should develop a threshold,
outlining and defining what constitutes an offensive/defensive AIenabled attack in the cyber plane, (Rashad, 2019). For instance, AI
attacks conducted by fully-autonomous applications should be
regarded as offensive.
e) AI as a Technology of Mass Destruction: It is intriguing to classify
the malicious AI technology as a Technology of Mass Destruction.
f) The Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Non-Combatants:
Amid the intense inclination to weaponize AI, coupled with the
absence of internet governance, a clause for protecting noncombatants
in cyberspace should be taken as a priority over other issues, (Guay et
al, 2017).
6) Establishing an IAEA-like Agency for AI Arms Control: “It is possible to
create an arms control regime by the establishment of an international
authority for regulating the usage of AI in the military realm”, (Al-Sayed,
2019). It is highly suggested to establish a supranational agency, referred to as
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the “International Agency for Regulating AI and Newly Emerging
Technologies”. The objectives of this Agency are: regulating the uses of AI
and curbing its malicious uses; ensuring a state’s compliance with AI peaceful
safeguards; slowing down AI proliferation. The competences of the Agency
include: overseeing the development of AI applications for military purposes
through the deployment of inspection missions, on a regular basis; ensuring a
state’s compliance with international AI safeguards and verification methods,
as well as encouraging and overseeing AI research and development in
member states. Further, the Agency, with the help of its technical staff, is
responsible for providing technical assistance and submitting technical
recommendations/reports to the UNSC, UNGA and the UN Office of
Disarmament Affairs. Furthermore, the Agency should cooperate with any OIs
to be created in the future or other like-minded IOs, which are responsible
ensuring nuclear safeguards and verifications, and promoting cyber safety and
security.

More important, it shall refer/file a case, when the pace of AI
development/race endangers international peace and security, to the UN
General Assembly or the UN Security Council.

The organizational structure of the anticipated Agency shall be composed of:
a. The General Forum; an international forum for discussing technicalities
and security implications of AI and emerging technologies. Each member
either a state, IO, INGO, academia, developer, technician or private
company has one vote. This Forum shall submit its recommendations and
suggestions, including multilateral agreements, to the Supreme Council;
b. The Supreme Council which shall be composed of 20 member-states and
5 miscellaneous members representing the academia, private sector and
competent IOs/INGOs, with equitable representation. Its resolutions are
binding. Those 20 members shall be elected every two years.
The competences of the Council shall include, inter alia,
I.

Discussing substantial matters;

II.

Determining if a certain act or step threatens international peace
and security. Should an action be proven to be a severe violation

57

of international legal instruments, the Council shall refer the
issue/case to the UN Security Council or competent IOs;
III.

Taking all measures, including, but not limited to, punitive
measures, should a member state violated the Charter,
international legal instruments regulating AI and other emerging
technologies, or have shown non-compliance with the Agency
Safeguards;

IV.

Cooperating with other IOs and INGOs, to mention but few, the
International Atomic energy Agency and the International
Telecommunication Union, for discussing and coming out with
solutions for any issue that threatens international peace and
security;

V.

Sponsoring bilateral agreements for AI software control.

c. The Research and Development (R&D) Department: This Department
shall be a global hub for R&D in AI and other emerging technologies. It
shall coordinate and compile all research and endeavors; call for further
research; submit reports/compiled recommendations to the General
Forum;
d. Technical Assistance Task Force and Inspection Missions: This body
shall provide technical assistance, if deems necessary or upon a state’s
request, to ensure a state’s compliance with the Agency Safeguards. The
Task Force shall be primarily composed of inspectors from the Agency.
Also, inspectors from like-minded IOs or Agencies, namely the IAEA,
can participate in the inspection missions, on a voluntarily basis;
e. M&E mechanisms, AI safeguards and Verifications: It shall ensure
members’ full compliance with the Agency Safeguards and Verification
Measures. It shall also develop new safeguards and verifications, when it
is deemed necessary.
Corresponding to nuclear safeguards, of which nuclear material and
facilities cannot be upgraded to a weapon-grade and are not used for
military purposes, (Safeguards Agreements), AI safeguards are
recommended for verifying the peaceful applications of AI and ensuring
a state’s compliance with the foresseable internationally-recognized AI
threshold. The AI Safeguards could include regular weapons and data
reviews; regular updates for AI applications; AI applications are not
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upgraded to a weapon-grade; a meaningful human control in the military
sphere; the disaggregation of civilian and military AI applications;
f. Department for Promoting the Rational Use of Weapons: This
Department shall be composed of sub-departments: nuclear, cyber and
conventional. It shall, in conjunction with the IAEA, ITU or state parties
to the United Nations Convention on Conventional Weapons, ensure the
proper usage of AI and other emerging technologies when they are bolted
into other weapons. It shall also curb or mitigate the misuse of AI and
other emerging technologies in the military realm.
g. The Dispute Settlement Mechanism: The Dispute Settlement Mechanism
shall settle any dispute that may arise between member states or a
member-state and a non-member state.
h. The Attributive Mechanism: The Mechanism shall provide advisory
opinions on attributive measures and shall develop a framework for
attribution and accountability by developing AI-enabled thresholds based
on the type of weapons used or the degree of destruction.
i. The Mitigation Mechanism: The Mechanism shall assist states in
remediating the unwanted impacts of wrongful use of AI application or
unintentional error.

7) Revising the Nuclear Arms Control Regime: With the growing challenges
of emerging technologies and AI, there is a need to revise the nuclear arms
control regime and add clause(s) regulating the uses of AI in the nuclear
domain.

A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step, internet governance is seen
as the stepping stone for AI regulations. Thereupon, a revolutionary paradigm-shift,
incorporating technical, ethical, moral and political dimensions in the standardization
process, (Burri, 2017) is a requisite for internet governance. Microsoft manager’s
suggestion of the formation of a neutral digital Switzerland is welcome since it will
harness the private companies to be detached from developing offensive
tech/applications; to combat state-sponsored cyberattacks, as well as establishing
attribution for state-sponsored cyberattacks and taking necessary measures to
remediate the repercussions of such large-scale attacks, (Smith, 2017).
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Appendix:

Annex (1):
The elements of MAD include:
1. Scale of Destruction: It basically focuses on the idea of “sparing” rather than
damage limitation, (Fairbanks, 2004). It considers number of causalities and
degrees of collateral damage and bloodshed. With the increase of inaccuracy
in weapon-targeting, the possibility of collateral damage increases, (Fairbanks,
2004). More importantly is the pace of devastation and its extremity, (Jervis,
2009), as well as the speed that causes devastation and damages to occur,
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(Schelling, 2008).
2. Proportionality of Punishment: As Thomas Schelling and Bernard Brodie
pointed out, it is all about reciprocal killing or “mutual kill”, (Jervis, 2009).
The US Department of Defense coined this phenomenon the “return evil for
evil”, (Schelling, 2008, p.7). It is also known as deterrence by punishment
which measures the extent of punishment and how it will inflict pain upon the
attacker.
3. The Demonstrative Aspect: It is the “power to hurt”, a sort of coercive
diplomacy by which the defender uses credible threats of inflicting damage
and ultimatums, with the aim of influencing the offender’s motives.,
(Schelling, 2008). It is a way of dissuading the offender from carrying out an
attack.
4. Motives and Interests: The heart of MAD is the psychological factor that
contributes to its success. It is the case where leaders are overwhelmed by
mutual fear of errors, intentions and conflict of interests, (Jervis, 2009).
5. Pace

of

Advancement

in

Military/Nonmilitary

Technology:

Modern

technologies favor defense due to their great lethality and mobility, as opposed
to infantry technologies and cavalry warfare which favored offense over
defense, given that the current technologies are not neutralized by the
innovation of novel and more advanced technologies (Van Evera, 2013).
6. Parity/disparity: It investigates how the level of parity/disparity in
technological advancement and weapon procurement could influence a state’s
decision and prove the existence of a security dilemma since such an
advancement emboldens the strength of a state vis-à-vis its rival, (Jervis,
2009).
7. Uncertainty: Uncertainty could arise over rivals’ intentions on whether they
are malicious or security-seeking, (Tang, 2009) since some weapons are
defensive in nature but can be offensively used, (Jervis, 2009).
8. Lack of Communication: Uncertainty over intentions reflects the lack of
communication between rivals since deterrence requires transparency, as
opposed to offense which requires secrecy over power, force, etc., (Van Evera,
2013).
9. Possible Implications in case of Intentional/Unintentional Error: The margin
of intentional versus unintentional error can be reflected in the case of the
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Cuban Missile Crisis. Therefore, it is urgent to raise the question about the
effects of error on the expected utility of AI.
10. Indivisibility of Control: The core of this idea is the unity of command and
control over weapons to make any MAD-like scheme effective, (Fairbanks,
2004).
11. Wartime Operation: A group of theorists argued that intensity of war is based
on (1) interests at stakes; the more interests at issue, the higher intensity of war
and (2) the ability to punish in return for escalatory acts, (Van Evera, 2013).
12. Second-strike Capability Vs. First-strike Capability: It is the rational calculus
of a first-strike based on the opponent’s ability to carry out a second-strike. It
nullifies the advantage of a first-strike since there is reciprocal fear of spiral
attacks and the first-mover advantage seems dangerous given that it can spur a
vicious circle of attack, (Van Evera, 2013). Thomas Schelling, however,
argued that the first-strike capability assesses benefits associated with using
weapons through preemptive strikes, (Van Evera, 2013). Its advantages
include: the feasibility of gaining surprise without detection, the shift in the
balance of power, and the dominance of offense when the attacker can defend
itself and conquer its rivals and, finally, the extent of political punishment,
(Van Evera, 2013).

Annex (2):
Detailed Description of Variables:
Independent Variables:
a. Human-over-the-loop: Human supervises the loop, though delegating tasks
to machines as it is the case in Air Drones. 1
1

De Spiegeleire, S., Maas, M., & Swejis, T. (n.d.). ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
AND
THE
FUTURE
OF
DEFENSE.
Retrieved
from
https://www.hcss.nl/sites/default/files/files/reports/Artificial Intelligence and the
Future of Defense.pdf
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b. Human-out-of-the-loop: Human has no control over machines since
machines have the power to decide and act. 2
Dependent Variables:
1) In the era of digital warfare, the degree of military digitalization varies from
one state to the other, thus, the degree of vulnerability varies as well. There are
three degrees of dependence on technology:
I.

Digitally-Independent States: A military does not have large networks
for command and control and its conventional weapons do not require
digital technology. Thus, a state is not vulnerable to cyberattacks,
(Schneider, 2016). 3

II.

Digitally-Enabled States: A state uses technology for the sake of
enhancing its network-centered military operations. Such a state
utilizes datalinks to convey off/circumvent targeting information. It
relies on digitally-enabled applications for cyber intelligence, so as to
raise situational awareness. The state’s military prefers analogue or
hard copy processes. Iran is a perfect example of such a state,
(Schneider, 2016).

III.

Digitally-Dependent States: A state that is highly dependent on
technology and its command and control systems are limitless over the
horizons and its military has data fusion centers. It implements
network-centered operations with the use of datalinks and virtual
computing. Virtual computing is highly effective for off-boarding
intelligence and for ensuring the optimization of decision-making.
More importantly, the state’s conventional operations heavily rely on
technology, (Schneider, 2016).

2) Sparing: The term “Sparing” is usually associated with MAD. The term
“sparing” implies that mutual vulnerability does exist. City-sparing and cybersparing were coined by theorists and experts when both nuclear and cyber
2

Russell, S. J., & Norvig, P. (2010). Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach.
Retrieved from https://www.cin.ufpe.br/~tfl2/artificial-intelligence-modernapproach.9780131038059.25368.pdf
3

Schneider, J. (2016). Digitally-Enabled Warfare. Retrieved from
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/digitally-enabled-warfare-the-capabilityvulnerability-paradox
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MAD loomed over in the IR literature. Now, with the current inclination to
develop AI applications for military purposes, the phenomenon could be
referred to as “machine-sparing”. The term “machine-sparing” portrays how
countries, cities, individuals, cyberspace, and machines are equally subjected
to mutual threats or attacks. The scale of destruction exceeds human control if
machines have been mandated to act.

“Machine-sparing” indicates that

militarized AI applications (used without any control or regulation) could
destroy the land and thereon.
3) Latent Violence: MAD becomes successful when latent violence is used by
the defender. The core of nuclear latent deterrence is the deterrence by
punishment, (Fuhrmann, 2018)4 whereas deterrence by denial is the principal
element of cyber MAD.

But for AI MAD, it is still unclear whether

deterrence by punishment, denial or entanglement would be a workable
strategy.
4) Expected Utility, (Slayton, 2017) and Cost-benefit Analysis: States, as per
IR theorists, act rationally and state leaders do not rush to war unless the
consequences are cost effective and the interests are vital for state survival. AI
applications usually have implications on the governmental decision-making
process, this is reflected in; policies, objectives, interests, values and
calculations with the increasing tendency to use them across sectors.
Furthermore, AI applications shape a state’s geographical position, political
values and foreign policy. AI applications also promote a state’s economic
progress, thereby affecting the calculus of war. Thus, the nature of the
utilization of nonmilitary capabilities will likely change due to AI
applications. The cost-benefit analysis may include:
Costs of Offense/Defense, (Slayton, 2017)5:

I.

The cost of military innovation in today’s world is crucial for making
accurate calculations and developing well-defined strategies and plans.
Military technology, like other types of technology and business

4

Fuhrmann, M. (2018). The Logic of Latent Nuclear Deterrence. Retrieved from
http://www.iserp.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/Deterrence without Bombs 2018-0129.pdf
5

Slayton, R. (2017, February 18). What Is the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance?:
Conceptions,
Causes,
and
Assessment.
Retrieved
from
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/648308/pdf
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organizations, have both direct and indirect costs, thereby shaping the
military strategy.
a) Direct Cost: Direct costs usually include the costs of software
development

and

regular

updates

of

software;

hardware

production; designing effective security systems in both virtual and
real realms; weapon production; coding; algorithms and swarms.
b) Indirect Cost: Indirect costs are comprised of the allocation of
spaces and laboratories; research and development (R&D); the
provision of infrastructure; the wages and salaries of software,
coding and algorithm developers, as well as the costs of training on
coding and algorithms for military staff and personnel.
II.

Comparison, (Handel, 1991)6: Every state investigates the degree of
advancement in its military equipment such as its defense system and
software (which is not enabled by AI). It compares the size of its
military forces and arsenals. It also determines the amount of data
possessed and retrieved through surveillance operations. In today’s
warfare and the information age, each state evaluates its capacities in
terms of intelligence operations and espionage. Such evaluation and
assessment definitely helps every state to recognize its comparative
advantage/strengths and its weaknesses, as opposed to other
states/adversaries.

III.

Calculus of War, (Handel, 1991): Every state should be compelled to
cross-examine:
(i)

the chances of victory, and how AI applications increase or
reduce the chances of victory in the case of considering an
offensive AI strike;

(ii)

the risks of disrupting AI applications and other similar
cyber capabilities in the case of considering a defensive AI
counterstrike and in the case of having an amateur security
system.

6

Handel, M. I. (1991). San Tzu and Clausewitz: The Art of War and On War
Compared. Retrieved from https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a239084.pdf
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More importantly, similar to nuclear weapons, the scale of
destruction and the number of causalities should be estimated since
offensive AI applications could make war much more destructive.
a. Duration and Scale of Operations: The duration of war is
usually considered by policy-makers since duration defines
the scale of operation, (Handel, 1991). This has
dramatically changed with the emergence of AI, given that
it is faster than the human pace.
b. Perception of Threats, (Handel, 1991): The security
dilemma is typically exacerbated when a state assumes its
interest(s) is/are at stake. The weaponization of AI will
redefine threats at all levels; policy-makers and security
experts will perceive threats differently since the war battle
has been transferred to cyberspace and has shifted from
being a war between military personnel to a war between
machines and AI-enabled systems. The perception of
threats will be based on the degree of dependence
on/independence from technology. Yet, the degree of
dependence on technology and cyber capabilities is critical
in perceiving threats; the implications of using conventional
capabilities, either disjointedly or alongside AI capabilities,
should be considered. Policy-makers will define threats
triggered by the development of AI capabilities as either
positive or negative.
c. Balance of Power: The inconvenience from the shift in the
balance of power comes first, since any shift in the balance
of power basically means putting a state’s interests at risk
and having a influence on a state’s decisions and abilities,
(Horowitz, 2018) 7 . AI, similar to other capabilities, will
alter the balance of power in favor of the superior, as
President Putin implied, the top AI application developer

7

Horowitz, M. C. (2018). Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the
Balance of Power. Retrieved from https://tnsr.org/2018/05/artificial-intelligenceinternational-competition-and-the-balance-of-power/
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will ultimately hold the most power. Nevertheless, AI
should be measured as a variable of power vis-à-vis other
sorts of power (i.e. economic, political or geopolitical, etc.).
5) Estimation

of

Military

and

Nonmilitary

Capabilities

(Highly

Advanced/Amateur): The estimation of non-AI military capabilities in terms
of quantity and degree of advancement, should be taken into consideration in
order to measure the effect of either highly advanced or amateur AI
capabilities on other them. The rationale behind this is to question the
significance of other capabilities with the possession of advanced AI.
6) Means

and

Levels

(Weak/Strong/Absent/Interconnected

of
Networks):

Communication
Since

the

security

dilemma is often tightened as a result of the lack of communication and
uncertainty over intentions, levels of communication should be hypothesized
as follows:
(i)

weak or strong, if humans have a role,

(ii)

absent or interconnected networks, if humans are absent and
out-of-the-loop.

The purpose is comparing levels of communication between states with the
presence or the absence of the human aspect.
7) Estimation of Quantities and Level of Advancement (Equal/Unequal) in
AI Applications: Disparity in nuclear capabilities increased the security
dilemma between the two superpowers during the Cold War era. As is the case
with nuclear weapons, the disparity in the number of possessed AI
applications and the level of advancement in AI software will exacerbate the
security dilemma. It is suggested to measure the parity/disparity in AI
capabilities as either equal or unequal, so as to help states in their calculations.
8) Intentions (Malicious/Security-seeking): Intentions are the cornerstone of
MAD and the security dilemma as they create uncertainty. Intentions could
either be malicious or security-seeking when the ruling elite has a say in the
military decision-making process.
9) Calculations (Right/Mistaken):

Unlike intentions, machines or software

cannot be judged on their intentions but they can be judged on the correctness
of their calculation.
10) Scope of Human Participation in the Decision-making Process
(Limited/Unlimited): Delegating the military’s decision-making process to
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machines (i.e. giving the machines absolute authority) is still highly unlikely,
though the declining role of human beings in military decision-making is
worthy of consideration with the emergence of AI.
11) Degree of Control Over Machines (Absent/Active): AI will not only
undermine role of humans in the decision-making process, but will also make
their role almost absent during the course of war. Thus, the degree of human
control over machines and software must be measured as either absent or
active.
12) Margin of Error (Human Vs. Machine): Both human and machine errors
are highly possible and highly destructive. Error should be measured as either
more common when the human is out of the loop/over the loop.
13) Command and Control (Reliable/Unreliable), (Slayton, 2017)8: With the
development of AI applications for military purposes, the absolute authority,
which was once only given to the military’s command and control system, has
become sharable and divisible with software and machinery.

With the

adoption of AI, the command and control system is unreliable, given that AIenabled machines, which could be mandated to make decisions, could be
disrupted. Therefore, AI command and control could either be reliable or
unreliable based on the degree of human control.
14) Attribution and Accountability: Comparable to cyber capabilities,
attribution and legitimacy are problematic not only because the difficulty of
identifying and proving the identity of the attacker but also the impossibility
of rebuking and penalizing a machine. It is also difficult to define
accountability of machines in absolute terms, according to international
lawyers, who are alarmed by the lack of efficacy and applicability of the Law
of Armed Conflicts in the AI realm. It is suggested to use the cyber attribution
indicators which include: technical, political and clandestine indicators,
(Somara, 2019)9. The technical indicators recess IP addresses and makes log
8

Slayton, R. (2017). What Is the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance? Conceptions,
Causes, and Assessment. International Security,41(3), 72-109.
doi:10.1162/isec_a_00267
9

(2019). Retrieved from
https://www.rand.org/multimedia/video/2019/01/14/accountability-in-cyberspace-theproblem-of-attribution.html?utm_source=WhatCountsEmail&utm_medium=RAND
Policy Currents AEM: Email Address NOT LIKE
DOTMIL&utm_campaign=AEM:631600804
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file analysis, through text-strings, timestamps, C2 infrastructure, malware
samples and credentials, (Davis et al, 2017)10 whereas the political indicators
assess the diplomatic knowledge about political motivation and political
operatives. Concerning the clandestine indicators or “All-Source Intelligence”,
they examine classified data obtained by signals-intelligence, human
intelligence and open-source intelligence, (Davis et al, 2017) coupled with
political insights, (Somara, 2019)11. Signals-intelligence (SIGNT) is produced
by collecting data from information technology systems, while Human
intelligence (HUMINT) is produced by obtaining data from humans, (Davis et
al, 2017). For all-source intelligence (OSINT) is produced by using open
sources such as the internet to collect and process information, (Davis et al,
2017).
15) Counterattacks/Counterforce, (Lieber et al, 2017) (Probable/Improbable):
There is an endless debate over the rationale of launching a preemptive or a
preventive strike amid a high probability of a retaliatory strike. As it was the
case with the nuclear weapons, AI could make a second-strike/counterattack
probable whether humans are over or out-of-the-loop.

Annex (3):
Brief History of AI:
The small Dartmouth Project, which took place in 1956, marked the birth of Artificial
Intelligence, (De Spiegeleire et al, 2017). Since then, AI, as a field of study, had
evolved across six main phases. The first phase or the “First AI Spring” (1956-1975),
marked the development of neural networks in its primitive forms, is considered as
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the early golden age of AI since AI researchers succeeded in developing tools and
prototypes systems capable of performing a limited range of tasks, such as algebra
and games, as if they are carried out by humans, (De Spiegeleire et al, 2017). At the
peak of the Cold War whereby the grandiose bulk of funds had been allocated to the
military sphere, the AI research had slipped into its first winter (1974-1980) and
speedy progress had been decelerated. In fact, the Cold War was not the sole reason
that contributed to the slippery of AI into its first winter but also the discovery of
ample possibilities for developing and underpinning AI algorithms in a manner that
could deal with real-world problems, thereby sparking disagreements among AI
researchers, (De Spiegeleire et al, 2017). In 1980s, AI research had witnessed its
second spring with the advent of expert systems which were actually a group of rulebased programs with limited tasks ranged from answering questions or solving
problems, and with massive funds provided by governments for promoting AI
research and the establishment of numerous AI companies, (De Spiegeleire et al,
2017). In spite of noticeable sales which reached up to 2 billion by 1988, many AI
companies collapsed and AI research had entered its age of darkness for many reasons
which included: (i) the development of desktop PCs by Apple and IBM and (ii) the
limited utility of expert systems, (De Spiegeleire et al, 2017). Meanwhile, AI
programs which were of military significance such as the autonomous battle tank
program raised considerable funding, (De Spiegeleire et al, 2017). In an effort to
reinvigorate AI research, AI researchers had disregarded their long-term goal of
developing human-level AI applications and directed their focus to fragmented
subfields by developing applications that solve specific problems, (De Spiegeleire et
al, 2017). Due to the increasing utility of AI in logistics, satellite monitoring,
spacecraft, traffic management, medical diagnostics and the military, funding had
soared up in the mid-2000s, (De Spiegeleire et al, 2017). Tremendous financial
contributions from Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Baidu, IBM and Microsoft have
furthered AI research since these corporates use AI for developing business models
and profit maximization, (De Spiegeleire et al, 2017). In response, AI has reached a
tipping point with the proven predictive accuracy of algorithms, the increasing
computing power, the Internet of Things and Big Data and cloud infrastructures, (De
Spiegeleire et al, 2017).

Annex (3):
The Elements of the Proposed AI MAD Structure:
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Mutually Assured Manipulation (MAM)

1. Scale of Destruction: The scale of destruction could exceed the destructive
potentials of nukes and conventional capabilities since they could be
manipulated or disrupted.
2. Proportionality: Proportionality could entail proportionality of manipulation,
so as to increase uncertainty. Manipulation could be the umbrella of other
sources of deterrence.
3. The Demonstrative Aspect (Latent Violence): States could employ deterrence
by punishment, denial, disruption or manipulation.
4. The Psychological Factor (Motives and Interests): Threat of manipulation and
the fear of uncertainty would definitely dissuade states from launching a firststrike.
5. Pace of Advancement in Military/Nonmilitary Technology: The everincreasing uncertainty over the adversary’s AI capabilities coupled with the
high potential of neutralizing a state’s defense and C2 systems makes
deterrence operative.
6. Parity/disparity: Disparity in AI could be reflected in the degree of
advancement in AI military applications, while the number of applications
would not be of great concern.
7. Intentional/Unintentional Error: Errors either triggered by machines or
humans could occur because of data manipulation and miscalculations.
8. Second-strike Capability: Massive retaliatory attacks are highly probable in AI
deterrence.
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